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ABSTRACT 
Speaking to an American audience in 1946, Winston Churchill articulated the 
British desire for “a special relationship” with America, coining a term which has 
continued to define the shifting vagaries of collaboration and consonance between the 
United States and the United Kingdom.1  Churchill’s statement underscores the historical 
importance of the Anglo-American relationship, an importance which has translated into 
unparalleled bilateral security cooperation through two World Wars and a Cold War, 
during ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and toward the global security 
challenges which will doubtless arise in the future.  This thesis unpacks the evolution of 
the “special relationship” in an effort to demonstrate the crucial role of intelligence 
sharing to the effectiveness of the Anglo-American partnership.  Intelligence sharing has 
been the scaffolding around which the particularity of the “special relationship” has 
always been constructed, from its inception in World War I until its present-day 
manifestation, and promises to be the key to the future of this uniquely intimate 
collaboration.  Indeed, intelligence sharing has galvanized the “special relationship” 
posited by Churchill and its formidable role in world affairs.  As the project will argue, 
maintaining the clear but measured intelligence exchange responsible for the unique 
character of America’s relationship to the United Kingdom remains vital to shaping the 
continued effectiveness of the Anglo-American “special relationship.” 
 
                                                 
1 David Dimbleby and David Reynolds.  An Ocean Apart: The Relationship Between Britain and 
America in the Twentieth Century.  Random House.  New York. 1988, 184. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the subject of intelligence sharing has 
been the topic of much public scrutiny and debate.  While much of the debate has focused 
on the problem of sharing intelligence within the U.S. Intelligence Community, the 
international nature of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and a commensurate level of 
international cooperation require a focus on maximizing intelligence sharing relationships 
with foreign allies.  Traditionally, America’s strongest foreign partnership has been with 
the United Kingdom; so unique is the place of the U.S.-UK relationship among 
America’s foreign alliances that the relationship has been dubbed “special” by many. 
Along with the political, strategic, military, economic, and ideological ties that 
bind the Anglo-American relationship, a key element to the success of the partnership has 
been intensive intelligence sharing.  The goal of this thesis is to answer the question: 
what is the significance of intelligence sharing to the Anglo-American “special 
relationship?”  This thesis answers the question by examining the past, present, and 
future of Anglo-American relations and the vital role of intelligence sharing to the 
“special relationship” in each timeframe.  First, this thesis discusses the critical role 
intelligence collaboration played in the origin and development of the “special 
relationship” across the 20th century.  Second, it examines the importance of U.S.-UK 
intelligence exchange in the decision to pursue military action in Iraq in 2003.  Third, this 
thesis emphasizes the crucial value of an effective intelligence sharing partnership in the 
future of the Anglo-American relations as the United Kingdom faces fundamental 
questions about its allegiances. 
This thesis contends that intelligence sharing clarifies the security threat, enabling 
the pursuit of common policies to counter the mutual threat.  Furthermore, this thesis 
asserts that Anglo-American intelligence cooperation has achieved this threat clarity 
across time in addressing and securing defeat of mutual enemies throughout U.S.-UK 
history, in fighting ongoing conflicts, and will continue to be essential to identifying and 
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confronting mutual threats in the future.  This thesis finds that intelligence sharing was 
vital to the genesis of the Anglo-American “special relationship” and essential to holding 
the partnership together through times of political strife by providing a baseline for 
continued trust and stability which remained after the political storms subsided.  This 
thesis also finds that intelligence sharing played a key role in establishing justification for 
pursuing a military solution to the mutually-perceived threat of weapons of mass 
destruction in the hands of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.  This thesis concludes that 
Anglo-American intelligence exchange will continue to operate most effectively if the 
United States and the United Kingdom maintain a close but measured political distance. 
B.  DEFINITIONS 
The term “intelligence” is utilized in a variety of ways, depending largely on the 
audience and the context.  Even within the loose confines of public policy, “intelligence” 
is often mistakenly used interchangeably with “information,” causing a tremendous 
amount of confusion, particularly among those who do not routinely operate within 
intelligence circles.  While intelligence and information are certainly related, intelligence 
generally functions as a subset of information, rather than as an interchangeable 
synonym.  For the sake of clarity and consistency, this thesis will use Mark Lowenthal’s 
definition of intelligence: “information that meets the stated or understood needs of 
policymakers and has been collected, refined, and narrowed to meet those needs.”2  For 
the purposes of this thesis, the term “intelligence” is used primarily in the context of 
products – pieces of data collected, processed, analyzed, and disseminated to meet 
policymakers’ needs.  Examples of intelligence cited more specifically in subsequent 
chapters include communications intercepts, satellite imagery, strategic intentions, 
indications of enemy movement, battle tactics, and enemy order of battle.  “Intelligence 
sharing,” then, is defined as the deliberate exchange of these pieces of intelligence data 
and analysis between two entities for the purpose of pursuing coordinated policies. 
 
 
                                                 
2 Mark Lowenthal.  Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy.  CQ Press. Washington, DC.  2006.  2. 
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Another term used extensively throughout this thesis and thus requiring 
clarification is “Anglo-American special relationship.”  As Chapter II demonstrates, the 
“special relationship” is based on many factors, and the meaning of the term itself tends 
to take the shape of the many socio-political vessels into which it is poured.  For the 
purposes of this thesis, however, the “special relationship” will be broadly defined as the 
tendency of American and British governments to seek the advice or support of one 
another in pursuit of foreign policy and to place greater value on that advice and support 
than that of other foreign alliances.  The “special relationship” implies a certain degree of 
preferential treatment, both in terms of a willingness to cooperate on policy matters and a 
mutual status of primus inter pares, or “first among equals.”3 
C. IMPORTANCE  
From the British perspective, much is to be gained from continuing the close 
intelligence sharing relationship currently enjoyed with the United States; conversely, the 
loss of this most important intelligence sharing relationship would be catastrophic.  The 
Americans have committed a greater percentage and overall quantity of their financial 
resources to their intelligence community than the British are either able or willing to 
expend.  In addition, maintaining close ties in general and sharing intelligence in specific 
translates into British influence over the world’s lone superpower, a position unique to 
the British and one they cannot afford to allow to atrophy.  Nile Gardiner elucidates the 
potential ramifications of this atrophy when he writes, “For Britain, there is much to lose 
from a weakening of the Anglo-American alliance: the further loss of national 
sovereignty, the diminution of British global power and influence, the loosening of 
defence [sic] and intelligence ties, and a weakening of the close-knit financial, trade, and 
investment relationship.”4 
                                                 
3 Douglas T. Stuart.  “‘Well, Isn’t That Special?’: Concluding Remarks on U.S.-UK Relations at the 
Start of the 21st Century.”  In U.S.-UK Relations at the Start of the 21st Century, ed. Jeffrey D. McCausland 
and Douglas T. Stuart.  (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, January 2006).  204. 
4 Nile Gardiner.  “British Conservatives Must Defend the U.S.-UK Special Relationship.”  Heritage 
Foundation.  WebMemo No. 1201.  August 28, 2006.  2. 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/upload/wm_1201.pdf  (accessed June 4, 2008). 
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From the American perspective, the United Kingdom represents its most 
important foreign alliance.  The U.S. movement toward multilateralism represents a 
necessary aspect of the GWOT, as the international nature of the GWOT requires 
international cooperation.  Emphasizing the abandonment of unilateral policies in pursuit 
of the GWOT, Derek Reveron concludes that America cannot “fight by itself a long, 
complex war waged by terrorists with a global reach.”5  Accordingly, the October 2005 
U.S. National Intelligence Strategy called for the American intelligence community to 
“strengthen existing foreign intelligence relationships to help meet global security 
challenges.”6  Given this multilateral dimension, the U.S.-UK relationship is of critical 
importance to America.  The United States must maintain its close relationship with the 
United Kingdom in order to retain at least this single supportive voice in international 
forums. 
Despite its history, closeness, and strategic importance, the U.S.-UK “special 
relationship” today hangs delicately in the balance.  The British hold the tenuous political 
position of being a key partner in alliances on both sides of the Atlantic.  At this critical 
crossroad, many analysts claim that the United Kingdom must choose its primary loyalty 
either to its traditional bond with the United States or to full integration with the 
European Union.  This decision point poses a tremendous problem for all parties with 
regard to intelligence sharing.  If the UK chooses EU integration over its relationship 
with the United States, will the Americans be able to continue to trust the British with 
their most intimate intelligence secrets?  If the UK chooses the United States over the 
EU, would that derail the EU’s efforts to increase intelligence sharing among its member 
states, develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy or European Security and Defense 
Policy, or integrate further? 
While sharing intelligence between sovereign nations creates daunting dilemmas 
(trust, vulnerability to espionage, concerns for national sovereignty, etc.), intelligence 
exchange represents a critical mechanism for promoting continued solidarity in U.S.-UK 
                                                 
5 Derek Reveron. “Old Allies, New Friends: Intelligence-Sharing in the War on Terror.”  Orbis.  Vol. 
50. Issue 3. Summer 2006.  454.  
6 United States Office of the Director of National Intelligence.  National Intelligence Strategy: 
Transformation through Integration and Innovation.  Washington, D.C.  October 2005.  5. 
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security relations.  The National Intelligence Strategy’s mandate to foster intelligence 
relationships with foreign allies acknowledges both the present and future contribution of 
key foreign partners such as the United Kingdom to the overall GWOT intelligence 
effort.7  Intelligence sharing is the critical element to maintaining and strengthening the 
trust upon which the U.S.-UK “special relationship” is predicated. 
D. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The very nature of intelligence makes sharing difficult.  Intelligence communities 
in countries around the world foster an environment of compartmentalization and “need-
to-know.”  This culture often times prevents individuals within a country’s own internal 
intelligence community from accessing segments of sensitive data, even if those 
individuals hold the appropriate security clearances.  Even more so, then, are these 
“compartments” protected from foreign eyes.  Richard J. Aldrich states, “Intelligence and 
security cooperation continues to be problematic because there is a fundamental tension 
between an increasingly networked world, which is ideal terrain for the new religious 
terrorism, and highly compartmentalized national intelligence-gathering.”8 
Intelligence communities also engender a tradition of over-classification.  This is 
particularly true of intelligence collectors and analysts in the United States, who 
perpetually default to the NOFORN caveat (not releasable to foreign nationals) in 
classifying intelligence products.  Disparities in clearances, intelligence handling 
procedures, background checks, training, classification nomenclature, etc. create at best a 
seed of doubt and at worst a sense of mistrust between international partners, which 
severely hinders the possibility of intelligence cooperation.  Additionally, sharing 
intelligence over long distances requires expensive and labor-intensive fielding, use, and 
maintenance of secure, multilateral systems.  For example, Linked Operational-
Intelligence Centers Europe (LOCE) for NATO partners and the Combined Enterprise 
Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) for the Global Counter-terrorism 
                                                 
7 United States Office of the Director of National Intelligence.  National Intelligence Strategy: 
Transformation through Integration and Innovation.  Washington, D.C. October 2005. 
8Richard J. Aldrich.  “Transatlantic Intelligence and Security Cooperation.”  International Affairs.  
Vol. 80. No. 4.  2004.  732. 
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Task Force have been largely successful, but both systems took a great deal of time, 
funding, and commitment from a large number of coalition partners to come to fruition. 
Furthermore, the wide variety of intelligence fields creates a diverse but disjointed 
intelligence community that hinders international sharing.  In the United States, the 
collection and analysis of signals intelligence (SIGINT) is overseen and controlled 
largely by the National Security Agency (NSA), imagery intelligence (IMINT) by the 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), and human intelligence (HUMINT) by 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).  
Other federal departments collect and manage intelligence specific to their organizational 
interests.  For example, each service within the Department of Defense maintains an 
organic intelligence apparatus which focuses on specific areas of expertise (appropriately, 
the Navy on maritime intelligence, the Air Force on air and space intelligence, etc.).  As a 
result, the United States has historically lacked a single point of interface for international 
intelligence sharing.  Instead, the military services and agencies tend to interact 
independently with their foreign counterparts.  At times U.S. intelligence interacts more 
effectively with its foreign counterparts than with agencies inside the U.S. intelligence 
community. 
Aldrich aptly elucidates this lack of cohesion in U.S. intelligence: “The American 
intelligence community has long been noted for its lack of communal identity.  Ingrained 
reluctance to share, together with incompatible data systems, was a key factor in 
explaining intelligence problems preceding 9/11.”9  Even the establishment of the 
supposedly overarching Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has, to 
this point, done little to resolve this issue inherent to the American intelligence 
structure.10  Although the recently updated Executive Order 12333 gives the U.S. 
Director of National Intelligence the mandate to function as a single point of interface for 
                                                 
9 Aldrich, 741. 
10 Scott Shane.  “Bush Issues Order Seeking to Unite the Efforts of U.S. Spy Agencies.”  New York 
Times.  August 1, 2008.  
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950CE2DB1E3BF932A3575BC0A96E9C8B63 (accessed 
October 1, 2008). 
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sharing intelligence with foreign governments and entities, it remains to be seen how 
effective that mandate will be in bringing resolution to this point of contention.11 
And yet in the case of the U.S.-UK intelligence sharing relationship, obstacles 
such as these have been overcome in the past and continue to be worked through in 
ongoing conflicts.  The Anglo-American intelligence relationship overcame these hurdles 
out of necessity; facing a common enemy – be it Nazi Germany, Soviet Communism, or 
Al Qaida – has energized a cooperative intelligence apparatus.  This intelligence 
exchange has solidified the U.S.-UK “special relationship” in a way that nothing else 
could.  Conventional wisdom holds that the “special relationship” was founded on three 
pillars: common culture, including history, language, values, and institutions; shared 
business interests, including to a large extent economic interdependence and foreign 
direct investment; and security cooperation.  This thesis argues that, while all three of 
these elements are integral to the “special relationship,” security cooperation is the most 
important leg in the triad and a leg that is often overlooked.  Furthermore, this thesis 
argues that the security aspect of the “special relationship” would be unable to stand 
alone without the indispensible factor of intelligence sharing.  Intelligence sharing 
solidifies the partnership by refining a common view of mutual threats, providing 
continuity through times of political conflict, and validating shared policies.  Finally, this 
thesis asserts that, as it has been in the past and is in the present, the Anglo-American 
intelligence partnership will continue to be absolutely essential to the effectiveness of the 
“special relationship” in the years to come. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A great deal of literature discusses, either directly or indirectly, the nature and 
origins of the “special relationship” that the United States and United Kingdom enjoy.  
The literature discusses the history, causes, motivations, and extent of the Anglo-
American partnership, largely seeking to examine what makes the “special relationship” 
special.  The literature researched for this thesis was restricted to the unclassified, open 
                                                 
11 Executive Order 12333: United States Intelligence Activities.  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/nationalsecurity/amended12333.pdf (accessed October 1, 2008). 
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source realm.  Every effort has been made to keep this thesis unclassified, primarily 
because a classified thesis regarding the importance of intelligence sharing would be 
inconsistent, as a limited distribution goes directly against the theme of the work.  
Though classified examples of intelligence sharing or failure to share might have 
provided additional evidence, the wealth of unclassified literature leads compellingly to 
the conclusions of this project. 
On the relationship’s beginnings, many works such as John Baylis’ Anglo-
American Defense Relations 1939-1984 and David Reynolds’ The Creation of the Anglo-
American Alliance 1937-41: A Study in Competitive Co-operation trace the roots of the 
“special relationship” back as far as the build-up to World War II.  These conclude that 
Lend-Lease policy and the resurgent German threat to Western interests clearly set the 
stage for a preferential U.S.-UK relationship which World War II sealed in blood.  A few 
authors stretch the special relationship’s beginnings back to the UK effort to spur the 
United States to action in World War I.  Among these are Phyllis Soybel’s A Necessary 
Relationship: The Development of Anglo-American Cooperation in Naval Intelligence 
and Barbara Tuchman’s The Zimmermann Telegram.  Soybel and Tuchman both argue 
that British intelligence in the form of decrypted German telegrams was vital in 
convincing a reluctant United States that conflict with Germany was imminent and  
drawing the Americans into World War I on the side of the Triple Entente. 
The Cold War tested the Anglo-American partnership in ways that the two World 
Wars had not.  Specifically, the issue of nuclear technology nearly severed the “special 
relationship.”  Two major articles which discuss this issue at length are Michael 
Goodman’s “With a Little Help from My Friends: The Anglo-American Atomic 
Intelligence Partnership, 1945-1958” and John Baylis’ “The 1958 Anglo-American 
Mutual Defence [sic] Agreement: The Search for Nuclear Interdependence.”  Both 
articles enumerate the difficulties brought on by the sudden truncation of Anglo-
American nuclear ties with the 1946 McMahon Act and the events which led to 
reconciliation in 1958 with the Mutual Defense Agreement. 
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An argument promoted by some critics in recent days, such as Robert Kagan in 
his incendiary Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order, 
asserts that friction between the United States and European countries, including the 
United Kingdom, has arisen due to the disparity in military capability and the willingness 
to flex military muscle in pursuit of policy.  In an article in Foreign Affairs published in 
2006, Lawrence D. Freedman dispels this notion as it pertains to the Anglo-American 
“special relationship.”  Arguing directly against Kagan, Freedman asserts that 
statistically, the British have actually gone to war more frequently since World War II 
than their American counterparts.  Freedman claims that the transatlantic angst stems, 
rather, from “U.S. hesitation and uncertainty when going to war.”12 Freedman discusses a 
pair of hiccups in the “special relationship” which he cites as examples in support of his 
argument, comparing the latest Iraq war with the conflict in the Falklands in 1982. 
In assessing the current Anglo-American partnership, numerous sources trumpet 
the strength and endurance of the “special relationship” the United States enjoys with 
their British counterparts, while others cite indicators that Anglo-American relations have 
begun to fizzle.  Freedman claims that, despite the aforementioned hiccups, the U.S.-UK 
relationship today remains strong, stating, “If anything, in recent years, this special 
relationship has enjoyed something of a revival.”13  Conversely, Dr. Nile Gardiner 
contends that the “special relationship” may be nearing extinction.  Gardiner dubs the 
relationship as “in jeopardy,” due to ongoing political movements “away from the United 
States and… closer to the European Union on major international issues.”14 
Numerous journal and newspaper articles give account of the current state of the 
“special relationship,” such as “British Conservatives Must Defend the U.S.-UK Special 
Relationship” written by the aforementioned Dr. Nile Gardiner of the Heritage 
Foundation  Two of the recent major works on the present state of Anglo-American 
relations are Peter Riddell’s Hug Them Close: Blair, Clinton, Bush and the ‘Special 
                                                 
12 Lawrence D. Freedman.  “The Special Relationship, Then and Now.”  Foreign Affairs.  Vol. 85, 
No. 3, May/June 2006. 62. 
13 Freedman, 61. 
14 Nile Gardiner, 2. 
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Relationship’, which discusses former British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s seemingly 
unquestioning support for American foreign policies, and John Dumbrell’s  A Special 
Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After, which examines 
Anglo-American relations leading up to September 11, 2001.  Most analysts agree that 
the ostensibly unwavering and unconditional support given President George W. Bush by 
Prime Minister Blair for military action in Iraq has tainted the effectiveness of the 
“special relationship.” 
Most sources discuss the “special relationship,” while including intelligence 
cooperation merely as a minor subset of the overall relationship, rather than as the 
primary object of study.  Among the relative few focused on Anglo-American 
intelligence or intelligence exchange are Peter Gudgin’s Military Intelligence: A History, 
written from the perspective of the British military intelligence establishment and 
Michael Herman’s Intelligence Power in Peace and War, comparing and contrasting U.S. 
and UK intelligence processes and architectures. 
International intelligence cooperation promotes a common threat perception by 
ensuring that each country’s decision makers are basing their views on the wealth of 
accumulated knowledge, not merely intelligence collected and analyzed by their own 
indigenous agencies.  Shared intelligence brings disparate viewpoints into alignment and 
enables multiple countries to pursue common policies in the face of a perceived mutual 
threat.  This idea is epitomized by an article written by Chris Clough in The International 
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence on the challenges of foreign intelligence 
sharing.  Clough states,  
The basic factor is perceived threat.  The relationship balances on the 
resources required to provide intelligence on that threat, countered against 
the potential risks inherent in cooperation.  But, if sufficient risk exists, 
cooperation can overcome any restraint.”15  Similarly, Bjorn Muller-Wille 
reinforces the cause and effect of intelligence exchange and perceived 
threat in his work on intelligence cooperation within the European Union, 
stating that “national threat perceptions are more likely to be compatible if 
the [European] Union and all member-states have access to the same 
                                                 
15 Chris Clough. “Quid Pro Quo: The Challenges of International Strategic Intelligence Cooperation.”  
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.  17:4, 2004. 605. 
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information and if the different national concerns are articulated and taken 
into consideration in an analysis based on the shared information.”16  His 
statement reinforces the notion that a connection between intelligence 
sharing and threat perception not only exists, but is paramount in 
improving international relations.  He sums up this idea succinctly: 
“Harmonizing the knowledge is the first step towards harmonizing views 
and security interests.17 
In turn, fostering common views on shared threats and shared enemies is vital to 
maintaining an alliance.  In his work on European integration in the latter half of the 20th 
century, Geir Lundstad invokes the realist school of international relations, stating that 
“almost without exception alliances do not survive the disappearance of the threat against 
which they are directed.”18  The opposite can also be logically inferred: that a critical 
element in maintaining an alliance is the sustainment of a common view of mutual 
threats.  Thus, because intelligence sharing has been shown to be essential in maintaining 
this common threat view, intelligence cooperation is also essential to the long-term health 
of alliances such as the “special relationship” enjoyed by the United States and the United 
Kingdom. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The early twentieth century saw the burgeoning Anglo-American alliance grow 
from a partnership of tacit security cooperation into a relationship of unprecedented 
collaborative intimacy – a transformation cultivated principally by the interchange of 
intelligence.  More recently, the matrix of mutual validation ensconcing this partnership 
has commanded the attention, and often the scrutiny, of countries around the world, as 
shared intelligence between Great Britain and the United States remains the subtext of 
avowed justification for joint acts of war and aggression.  This project unpacks the 
evolution of such intimacy, plotting points in history and in contemporary culture that 
offer a better sense of the trajectory that the partnership may travel throughout the 
                                                 
16 Bjorn Muller-Wille.  “EU Intelligence Co-operation: A Critical Analysis.”  Contemporary Security 
Policy.  23:2. August 1, 2002. 71. 
17 Muller-Wille, 71. 
18 Geir Lundestad. “Empire” by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997.  
Oxford University Press.  Oxford.  1998. 167. 
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coming decades.  With this trajectory in view, this thesis argues that the United States 
and the United Kingdom must maintain the intelligence sharing upon which their 
partnership is predicated at a rate moderated to preserve each nation’s independent 
sovereignty. 
Laying the groundwork for this assertion, Chapter II examines the history of the 
Anglo-American “special relationship” and the influence that intelligence exchange had 
on the creation and solidification of the relationship.  This chapter argues that the popular 
notion – culture, business interests, and security cooperation bond the “special 
relationship” – is incomplete without including U.S.-UK intelligence sharing as the key 
element.  It argues further that security cooperation is the most important of these three 
factors, and that intelligence sharing is its defining characteristic.  Relying upon three 
main cases studies – World War I, World War II, and the Cold War – Chapter II 
demonstrates how vital intelligence exchange was to the origin of Anglo-American 
security cooperation, to the solidification of the relationship through military success, and 
to ensuring the vitality of the partnership in spite of political strife.  American entry into 
World War I on the side of the British hinged on a single piece of shared intelligence.  
The Allies developed a successful strategy to counter the German U-boat threat in World 
War II due to the efforts of shared Anglo-American intelligence.  The Cold War showed 
how integral intelligence was to the “special relationship” in that the relationship 
sustained severe damage through legislation, high profile spy cases, and the deliberate 
withholding of intelligence during the Suez crisis, yet the partnership succeeded 
tremendously when intelligence was shared.  
Building upon this groundwork, Chapter III discusses the impact of bilateral 
intelligence sharing on the respective British and American decisions to go to war in Iraq, 
as well as the impact of the Iraq war on the effectiveness of the U.S.-UK intelligence 
sharing relationship on the international stage.  This chapter asserts that the attacks of 
September 11, 2001 resulted in policy changes which expanded the previous definition of 
a threat to include states which supported terrorism and possessed or pursued weapons of 
mass destruction.  This shift in threat characterization prompted Britain and the United 
States to view war with Saddam Hussein’s regime as the most logical solution for 
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safeguarding against the possibility of weapons of mass destruction ending up in the 
hands of terrorists.  This chapter argues that both American and British leadership used 
intelligence to justify to the public their respective choices to go to war, and that the 
intelligence upon which those justifications were made had been shared between the 
United States and the United Kingdom.  The failure of Anglo-American intelligence in 
Iraq has mitigated the effectiveness of the U.S.-UK intelligence partnership through a 
diminution in credibility and has prompted questions from policy analysts on both sides 
of the Atlantic about where British loyalty should lie. 
Examining the quandary created by the failure of Anglo-American intelligence in 
the Iraq war and the uncertain waters into which such a failure thrusts the “special 
relationship,” Chapter IV elaborates on the potential for continued intelligence 
cooperation between America and Great Britain.  Additionally, this chapter examines 
ramifications on the future effectiveness of the Anglo-American intelligence sharing of 
the pending British decision of EU integration.  It argues that an overt British declaration 
of loyalty either to the United States or to the European Union would serve to diminish 
further the effectiveness of the “special relationship.”  This chapter asserts that Anglo-
American intelligence cooperation is crucial in addressing emergent threats in the 21st 
century, and that, in order to operate most effectively, the British should continue to 
conduct policy in their traditional role as a transatlantic bridge. 
Finally, Chapter V asserts that intelligence sharing was, is, and will be vital to the 
security facet of the Anglo-American relationship, and thus to the “special relationship” 
overall.  In order to preserve the unique and longstanding intimacy between the United 
States and the United Kingdom, both countries must continue to collaborate in their 
accrual of sensitive intelligence, measuring this collaboration with deliberate care, 
ensuring the security of each country without sacrificing the sovereignty of either. 
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II. INTELLIGENCE SHARING IN THE HISTORY OF THE 
“SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP” 
A. THREE RECURRING THEMES 
Historian Ray Raymond asserts that “some kind of intimate and unbreakable link 
does exist between the United States and Britain, and its roots are very deep.”19  The 
“special relationship,” in ways spoken and unspoken, codified and understood, explicit 
and implicit, is a very real and often times tangible phenomenon.  Modern examples from 
Prime Minister Blair’s response to 9/11, to continued British troops commitments to 
Operation Iraqi Freedom despite overwhelming public opposition to the war, to shared 
U.S.-UK policies, to the plethora of joint meetings between both countries’ key leaders, 
demonstrate that the Anglo-American relationship has repeatedly proven itself as 
“special.”  Even American and British citizens feel a kinship, and it is a kinship 
recognized as “special” in greater Europe and throughout the world. 
Historians consistently rely on three themes to explain why the relationship is so 
special: common culture, economic interdependence, and security cooperation.  While 
each of these themes is important to the Anglo-American partnership, the security aspect 
of the relationship sets it apart as truly special.  Yet, because the both Britain and the 
United States enjoy security arrangements with numerous countries, even this pillar 
would not by itself render the relationship “special” without something else cementing 
the partnership, creating an indissoluble bond and maintaining its strength and resilience 
through difficult times.  This chapter asserts that intelligence cooperation makes the 
“special relationship” powerful, effective, and enduring, and that without intelligence 
exchange the three traditionally accepted pillars of the “special relationship” could not 
stand. 
Common culture cannot explain the fluctuations in the U.S.-UK relationship, and 
close financial ties with other countries indicate that economic interdependence is not the 
                                                 
19 Ray Raymond.  “The U.S.-UK Special Relationship in Historical Context: Lessons of the Past” in 
U.S.-UK Relations at the Start of the 21st Century, edited by Jeffrey D. McCausland and Douglas T. Stuart.  
Strategic Studies Institute. January 2006. 1. 
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determining factor of the Anglo-American “special relationship.”  Intelligence exchange 
– generally considered a subset of security operation – is the bedrock on which Anglo-
American security cooperation has succeeded, and without which such success would 
have been impossible. 
Intelligence sharing has proven vital to the formulation, strength, and continuity 
of the “special relationship.”  This paper argues that, while not necessarily superior to 
those overarching themes, intelligence exchange between the United States and the 
United Kingdom has played the critical role of establishing and maintaining the 
partnership’s closeness, even through times of tremendous political anxiety and is 
therefore a key component of the Anglo-American “special relationship.” 
B. COMMON CULTURE IS THE FOUNDATION, BUT NOT THE WHOLE 
HOUSE 
Many historians hold that the U.S.-UK relationship is “special” due to 
commonalities in culture.  While common culture cannot account for the fluctuations in 
the relationship, shared culture certainly provided an important element in the foundation 
of the “special relationship.”  Britons and Americans share history, language, heritage, 
core values, beliefs, and a legal structure in a way that is unique and specific to the 
partnership.  While introducing Winston Churchill to a New York audience in 1900, 
Mark Twain described the “special relationship” in a way which still summarizes the 
U.S.-UK bond more than a century later: “We have always been kin: kin in blood, kin in 
religion, kin in representative government, kin in ideals, kin in just and lofty purposes.”20  
Because of these commonalities, Americans and Britons tend to hold similar views of one 
another and of the world at large; as George Ball said, “to an exceptional degree we look 
out on the world through similarly refracted mental spectacles.”21 
Although it does not stand alone in generating the uniqueness of the “special 
relationship, common culture did create a framework within which the “special 
                                                 
20 As quoted in “Anglo-Saxon Attitudes.”  The Economist.  March 27, 2008.  
http://www.economist.com/world/britain/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10926321 (accessed August 13, 2008). 
21 As quoted in John Baylis.  Anglo-American Defense Relations 1939-1984: The Special 
Relationship.  St. Martin’s Press.  New York.  2nd Ed.  1984. xvii. 
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relationship” could be established.  First, shared language fosters an immediate rapport 
and understanding which neither the United States nor the United Kingdom enjoys with 
countries such as France, Germany, Russia, or China.  Even other countries with which 
the United States has been said to maintain a “special relationship” must overcome a 
language barrier which does not exist between the United States and the United 
Kingdom.  Although Canada maintains certain special intimacies with the United States 
mainly due to its geographic proximity, as do Australia and New Zealand due to shared 
language and values, the unique combination of common heritage and history found in 
the U.S.-UK relationship generates a primacy that cannot be found even among other 
English-speaking countries, or the so-called “Anglosphere.”  Additionally, common core 
values elevate the Anglo-American partnership above their relations with other countries 
which do not espouse liberal democracy and individual rights.  Furthermore, a shared 
basis in common law and legal structure provides both countries an apparatus with 
virtually interchangeable legal, governmental, and military parts.  That these cultural 
commonalities played a substantial role in forming the basis of the “special relationship” 
is indisputable. 
The common culture argument by itself, though, leads one to conclude that the 
“special relationship” existed and has been constant since the Revolutionary War.  
Writing in this vein, Raymond contends that the seeds of the Anglo-American “special 
relationship” were planted and have remained firmly rooted since the 18th century in the 
commonalities of British and American culture.  He claims that during the Revolutionary 
War the American colonists did not rebel against England because they hated the British 
or abhorred being British subjects, but rather because they felt that the British parliament 
had abandoned the primary ideals of what it meant to be British.  According to Raymond, 
the British “concept of liberty meant parliamentary consent to taxation, representative 
government, habeus corpus, trial by jury, and protection of the individual citizen from 
arbitrary arrest and from a corrupt government.”22   
                                                 
22 Raymond, 5. 
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Raymond asserts that because the British had forsaken these fundamental 
privileges when ruling the colonies, the American colonists found it, famously, 
“necessary to dissolve the political bands which connected them.”23  He claims that “the 
colonists were not trying to reject their treasured British heritage, but rather to reaffirm 
and reclaim it from a foolish King and a corrupt political cadre.”24  Essentially, the 
Americans rejected the British because, from their vantage point, the British had become 
un-British.  According to David McCullough's Pulitzer Prize-winning biography of 
American founding father John Adams, Adams affirmed this notion in a widely-
circulated 1765 essay which McCullough describes as “a statement of [Adams’] own 
fervent patriotism and the taproot conviction that American freedoms were not ideals still 
to be obtained, but rights long and firmly established by British law.”25 
Even the manner with which the American colonists declared their collective 
independence reflected their British roots.  Raymond quotes Winston Churchill, saying 
“The Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution are not only American 
documents.  They follow on the Magna Carta and the English Bill of Rights as the great 
title deeds in which the liberties of the English-speaking peoples are founded.”26 
Raymond asserts that “the real reason the special relationship is special… is that 
so much of the basic DNA of the infrastructure of the American political, legal, and 
economic system is British.”27  In essence, historians suggest that the “special 
relationship” stems from the idea that when Britons and Americans look at each other 
across the Atlantic, they see a people, a government, and a society which differs little 
from their own. 
That Americans and Britons share history, culture, values, and structures is a fact 
which has not changed in four centuries, yet the relationship has been anything but 
steady.  Drawing the “special relationship” all the way back to the American Revolution 
                                                 
23 The U.S. Declaration of Independence. 
24 Raymond, 5. 
25 David McCullough.  John Adams.  Simon & Schuster.  2001.  59. 
26 Raymond, 6-7. 
27 Raymond, 4. 
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by virtue of common culture ignores not just mere strains in the relationship, but its clean 
breaks as well.  These commonalities cannot, for example, explain outright war in 1812, 
the ambivalence of the British during the American Civil War, the political conflict 
during the Suez crisis in 1956 or over Grenada in 1983.  Indeed, if common culture were 
the deciding factor on the success of the relationship, then the aforementioned strains and 
breaks would never have occurred at all.  Shared culture, language, history, and values 
cannot explain the “special relationship” because they have remained essentially 
unchanged since before the American Revolution, whereas the U.S.-UK relationship has 
fluctuated tremendously during this same time period.  The commonalities between the 
United States and the United Kingdom inarguably form a foundation on which the 
“special relationship” was built, but because this factor does not account for the 
fluctuations in the relationship, it cannot stand alone as the “special relationship’s” 
defining characteristic. 
C.  BUSINESS IS IMPORTANT, BUT NOT SPECIAL 
Economic interdependence is another recurring theme in the literature on the 
elements of the “special relationship.”  Like the common culture argument, economic 
interdependence clearly constitutes an integral element in the foundation of the “special 
relationship; but also like common culture, economic interdependence cannot stand on its 
own in explaining the “special relationship.”  That is not to diminish the importance of 
the business aspect of the “special relationship.”  Indeed, economics was the very origin 
of the United Kingdom’s relationship with America: exploration of the New World was a 
for-profit enterprise.  As a mercantilist empire, the British had sought to expand their 
access to previously untapped natural resources and found an abundance of those 
resources in America.  For example, the failed British colony at Roanoke Island in 1584, 
the successful one at Jamestown in 1607, as well as the numerous others which followed 
began primarily as business ventures.  Additionally, the British tried so desperately to 
defeat the colonists in the American Revolution because they did not want to lose the 
wealth being generated for the crown by the colonies, setting a precedent for other 
colonies to emulate which further reduced British global power and wealth. 
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The close economic bond that was born during the colonial period remains strong 
to the present day.  Even after the Revolution, Great Britain remained the foremost 
trading partner of the United States.  The War of 1812 began in large part because the 
British had imposed trade restrictions on the United States.  From the middle of the 19th 
century onward, Britain and America became increasingly economically interdependent, 
prompting the British premier to declare that anyone “who wishes prosperity to 
England… must wish prosperity to America.” 28  The Anglo-American economic 
relationship remains strong even after two world wars have left the United States the 
stronger economic power.  The economic ties endure as a vital element in the “special 
relationship.”  In 2007, the United Kingdom accounted for over 3.4% of total U.S. trade, 
an amount in excess of $100 billion. 29  The United Kingdom remains to this day 
America’s primary destination of Foreign Direct Investment in the European Union.30   
Certainly, Anglo-American history is steeped in a business partnership, and 
without such positive economic relations, the U.S.-UK relationship could not possibly be 
deemed “special.”  However, as stated previously, the economic aspect cannot stand 
alone.  Even excluding NAFTA partners Canada and Mexico, the United Kingdom 
ranked a distant fourth among overseas U.S. trade partners in 2007 (behind China, Japan, 
and Germany).31  This demonstrates that while the United Kingdom is one of America’s 
primary trading partners, it still lags far behind China and is not even the most prolific 
trading partner within the European Union.  Again, if economic interdependence were 
the key factor in characterizing a political relationship as “special,” then this title might 
be more apt for China, Germany, Canada, or others. 
 
                                                 
28 Bradford Perkins.  The Cambridge history of American foreign relations: volume I, the creation of a 
republican empire, 1776-1865.  Cambridge University Press.  1993.  206 
29 U.S. Census Bureau.  “Foreign Trade Statistics.”  http://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/statistics/highlights/top/top0712.html (accessed August 14, 2008). 
30 Michael Calingaert.  “The Special Relationship – Economic and Business Aspects: American 
Perspective.” in U.S.-UK Relations at the Start of the 21st Century, edited by Jeffrey D. McCausland and 
Douglas T. Stuart.  Strategic Studies Institute. January 2006. 21. 
31 U.S. Census Bureau.  “Foreign Trade Statistics.” 
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Although the Anglo-American trade relationship has remained strong since the 
19th century, the overall political relationship has traveled a bumpy road, often because of 
conflict stemming from economic divergences.  British economic policies generated 
strife between Britain and the United States during the American Civil War by trying to 
conduct commerce with the South through the Federal blockade, by receiving 
Confederate emissaries looking for economic aid, and by supplying arms and combat 
ships to the South.32  Economic conflict continued to encumber Anglo-American 
relations through the turn of the century as well: in settling the territorial dispute Alaska 
and Canada following the Klondike gold rush, 33 in claiming development rights and 
influence over the Panama Canal,34 and in establishing power and boundaries in 
Venezuela and other parts of Latin America.35  Yet, during this period, Britain and 
America continued down the road toward economic interdependence.  According to 
Bradford Perkins, at the end of the 19th century, “Imports [to Britain] from the United 
States roughly equaled those from Britain’s own empire… In addition, the United States 
took more exports [from Britain] than any other nation.”36 
These fluctuating periods of economic distress and burgeoning trade did not occur 
coincidentally with the emergence of the “special relationship.”  Like common culture, 
economic interdependence assisted in laying the groundwork for the Anglo-American 
relationship to become “special.”  However, because it was not directly responsible for 
generating the unique conditions which set the Anglo-American relationship apart, the 
economic aspect of the “special relationship” does not independently make the Anglo-
American relationship “special.” 
 
                                                 
32 Perkins, 224-228. 
33 William H. Becker.  “America Adjusts to World Power.”  in Economics and world power: an 
assessment of American diplomacy since 1789.  Edited by William H. Becker and Samuel F. Wells, Jr.  
Columbia University Press.  New York.  1984.  205. 
34 Walter LaFeber.  The Cambridge history of American foreign relations: volume II, the American 
search for opportunity, 1865-1913.  Cambridge University Press.  1993.  192. 
35 Walter LaFeber.  “The Background of Cleveland’s Venezuelan Policy: A Reinterpretation.”  The 
American historical review.  Volume 66.  Number 4.  July 1961.  947. 
36 Perkins, 206. 
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D.  SECURITY COOPERATION 
The third pillar in the literature on the U.S.-UK “special relationship” is bi-lateral 
cooperation in areas of mutual security concern.  The security aspect of Anglo-American 
relations sets the partnership apart as unique and distinct in ways that culture and 
business could not.  James Wither states, “The military partnership is a feature of Anglo-
American relations that truly justifies the description ‘special.’  No other aspect of the 
relationship involves the shared privations and risks of combat, including the payment of 
the ‘blood price’ famously referred to by Prime Minister Tony Blair.”37  As Wither 
alludes, one reason security trumps the other two legs of the triad is that Americans and 
Britons have repeatedly fought and bled to preserve one another’s existence.  In this way, 
the “special relationship” is the direct result of the Shakespearean “band of brothers” 
mentality, where men and peoples are bonded together through shared sacrifice when 
confronted with a common enemy.  A second, more important reason is that the ebb and 
flow of the overall Anglo-American relationship has been tied directly to security 
cooperation. 
Security cooperation encompasses several elements – among them, coordinated 
military operations, collaboration on plans and policies, and sharing intelligence on 
threats of mutual concern.  The key to unlocking the door to success in U.S-UK security 
cooperation, and hence the defining characteristic of the security aspect of the Anglo-
American “special relationship,” was the shared view of a common threat reinforced by 
bilateral intelligence exchange.  Intelligence sharing augments every other aspect of 
security cooperation, yet it requires a unique level of trust, over and above the level 
required for the other aspects.  The trust mandated by intelligence sharing makes it stand 
apart within the sphere of security cooperation. 
 
                                                 
37 James Wither.  “An Endangered Partnership: The Anglo-American Defence Relationship in the 
Early Twenty-first Century.”  European security.  Volume 15.  Number 1.  March 1, 2006.  48.  For 
referenced statement concerning the British willingess to pay the ‘blood price’ to secure the “special 
relationship” with the United States, see “Britain Will Pay ‘Blood Price’ – Blair.” BBC News.  September 
6, 2002.  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/2239887.stm (accessed November 6, 2008). 
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As mentioned previously, the Anglo-American relationship was littered with 
conflict in one form or another for more than a century.  As the relationship developed 
through the 19th century and into the early years of the 20th century, America and Britain 
became more dependent upon one another to protect matters of mutual concern in their 
respective hemispheres.  According to William Becker, “America needed Great Britain to 
maintain the historic balance of power in Europe… Britain deferred more and more to the 
United States in Latin America.”38  In spite of a tacit understanding that security 
cooperation – presumably in the form of military assistance -- would be forthcoming if 
necessary, nothing in the Anglo-American relationship was substantiated by shared 
intelligence prior to 1917, making the alliance tenuous at best.  Although Britain and 
America had a foundation in common security concerns, legitimate U.S.-UK security 
cooperation – with two sovereign nations operating as full partners to defeat a shared 
enemy – did not occur until World War I. 
1. World War I 
World War I holds what might be the single greatest example of the power of 
intelligence exchange to influence security policy.  Although the United States shared 
political concerns with the United Kingdom during World War I, U.S. President 
Woodrow Wilson declined to intervene militarily until the British shared a crucial piece 
of sensitive intelligence with him.  American participation in World War I was not a 
foregone conclusion.  President Wilson won re-election in 1916 under the slogan “He 
kept us out of the war!”  Maintaining the prevailing isolationist, non-interventionist 
sentiment, Wilson viewed the “Great War” as a European struggle in which the United 
States had but a passive interest and no greater personal role than mediator.  The United 
Kingdom viewed Wilson as obstinate and the vast American resources as the potential 
savior for the greatly depleted Triple Entente.  The British believed the balance would 
permanently shift in their favor if the United States could be convinced to throw their 
substantial weight to the side of the Triple Entente. 
                                                 
38 Becker, 205. 
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For three years, Germany successfully kept the United States on the sidelines.  In 
the face of stark American opposition, Germany ceased from its fundamental strategy of 
unrestricted submarine warfare.  This German concession was sufficient to overcome the 
cultural and economic bonds between the United States and the United Kingdom and 
natural sympathy for the Triple Entente: America maintained her neutrality. 
That changed, though, when the British shared crucial intelligence with the 
United States.  On January 17, 1917, British Naval Intelligence, under the innocuous 
moniker of “Room 40,” decrypted a classified telegram sent by German Foreign 
Secretary Arthur Zimmermann to the German Ambassador to the United States, Johann 
von Bernstorff.  The telegram bore the classification “Most Secret” and gave von 
Bernstorff instruction that it “be handed on to the Imperial Minister in Mexico by a safe 
route.”39  The telegram read: 
We intend to begin unrestricted submarine warfare on the first of 
February.  We shall endeavor in spite of this to keep the United States 
neutral.  In the event of not succeeding, we make Mexico a proposal of 
alliance on the following basis: make war together, make peace together, 
generous financial support, and an understanding on our part that Mexico 
is to reconquer the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona.  The 
settlement in detail is left to you. 
You will inform the president [of Mexico] of the above most secretly as 
soon as the outbreak of war with the United States is certain and add the 
suggestion that he should, on his own initiative, invite Japan to immediate 
adherence and at the same time mediate between Japan and ourselves. 
Please call the president’s attention to the fact that the unrestricted 
employment of our submarines now offers the prospect of compelling 
England to make peace within a few months.  Acknowledge receipt. 
Zimmermann.40 
Following the herculean decryption effort on the part of Room 40 analysts, British 
intelligence knew that it had in the Zimmermann telegram the key to persuading the 
United States to enter the war.  The British delayed giving the telegram’s contents to the 
                                                 
39 Barbara W. Tuchman. The Zimmermann Telegram.  The Macmillan Company.  New York.  1958. 
6. 
40 Tuchman, 146. 
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Americans to ensure the security of the sources and methods of the British cryptanalysts, 
such that Wilson did not receive the telegram until February 26.  Upon receipt, Wilson 
asked his envoy in London to thank the British “for information of ‘such inestimable 
value’ and to convey his very great appreciation of ‘so marked an act of friendliness on 
the part of the British government.’”41  The Germans had already resumed unrestricted 
submarine warfare, but Wilson’s great incredulity was reserved for the notion that 
Germany would support a direct attack against American soil via Mexico.  Later that 
week, the text of the telegram was released to the public, and on April 2, 1917 Wilson 
asked Congress to declare war on Germany. 
For the British, the sharing of this specific piece of intelligence accomplished its 
desired effect: it was crucial to drawing America into the war.  For the Americans, the 
Zimmerman telegram marked the beginning of significant intelligence sharing with the 
British and a special Anglo-American relationship which would ultimately secure victory 
in World War I.  Given Wilson’s entrenched stance on neutrality, Anglo-American 
security cooperation was unlikely without the intelligence provided by the British.  In his 
work on the history of Room 40, Patrick Beesly summarized the impact of British-
American intelligence exchange during World War I, stating that without the intelligence 
obtained by the British and shared with the United States, “America would not have been 
dragged into the war in April 1917.  Good Intelligence was the keystone of victory.”42  
However limited the ability of the Americans to collect and share intelligence, the effect 
of British willingness to share its intelligence was key in establishing the “special 
relationship” on which Wilson based his decision to enter the war. 
Another point to be drawn out of America’s entry into World War I is the fact that 
Wilson would not budge until the intelligence he received from the British prompted him 
to view the German threat the same way the United Kingdom did.  The Zimmermann 
telegram convinced Wilson that citizens’ lives, the country’s territorial integrity, and 
national sovereignty were in jeopardy due to German aggression, a view which matched 
                                                 
41 Tuchman, 173. 
42 Patrick Beesly.  Room 40: British Naval Intelligence 1914-1918.  Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.  New 
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Britain’s perspective on its own condition.  At the point when a mutual threat was 
acknowledged, American entry on the side of the British became inevitable.  This mutual 
threat, however, was only brought into focus through intelligence sharing; without it, as 
Beesly stated, Wilson would probably have remained entrenched in neutrality and 
America would not have entered into the war when it did, if at all.  This marks one of the 
distinct values of intelligence exchange: the ability to generate a common view of threats 
in order to pursue a shared solution.  Intelligence sharing was the impetus behind the 
security aspect of the “special relationship” and became the fertile soil in which the 
relationship grew and flourished through the end of the century. 
2. World War II 
While experts may differ regarding the exact point at which the U.S.-UK 
partnership became “special,” most historians agree that the Anglo-American “special 
relationship” reached a high point during World War II.  Wither goes so far as to define 
the “special relationship” by its relation to World War II; he describes the partnership as 
“an unusual bi-lateral bond that was forged in the Second World War.”43  John Baylis, in 
his work on U.S.-UK defense relations in the 20th century, cites a joint British-American 
post-war study, in which “the authors suggest that it was during the Second World War 
that the intimacy of cooperation was raised to a new level ‘never before realised [sic] or 
even approached’ by other sovereign states.”44  Baylis also quotes George Marshall, who 
described the Anglo-American wartime relationship as “the most complete unification of 
military effort ever achieved by two allied states.”45  The closeness and success of U.S.-
UK military collaboration during World War II was directly proportional to shared 
intelligence. As intelligence sharing increased, diplomatic coordination, political 
cooperation, and military integration into command and control structures increased in 
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kind.  Intelligence collaboration enabled strategic, operational, and tactical success 
throughout the war; without intelligence sharing, the Allies would almost certainly have 
lost World War II. 
The Anglo-American intelligence sharing relationship during World War II was 
forged by practicality and necessity.  The British and the Americans faced a common 
enemy which threatened the existence of the former and the ideology of both.  By virtue 
of geographic proximity, Great Britain was the primary target of the Germans on the 
Western Front (after the fall of France, naturally) and the obvious location from which to 
stage Allied resistance.  By virtue of its relative size and abundant resources, both in 
material terms and in personnel, America was obliged both to resupply its British ally and 
forward deploy troops and supplies to Great Britain to contribute to the Allied effort in 
Europe.  The result was an unprecedented integrated Anglo-American military command 
and control structure, undergirded by a near-seamless intelligence sharing apparatus.  For 
instance, as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Eisenhower employed a 
fully integrated staff, which set a precedent during the war which later became the 
foundation for NATO integrated operational structure.  Although the examples of Anglo-
American intelligence exchange during World War II are numerous, the Battle of the 
Atlantic typifies the strength and depth of the intelligence sharing relationship during this 
tumultuous period. 
Anglo-American intelligence sharing was vital to Allied success in the Battle of 
the Atlantic in two ways.  First, intelligence collaboration altered the strategy of maritime 
shipping protection.  When the war began, British merchant shipping made itself 
vulnerable to U-boat attacks by vessels sailing alone.  According to Richard Overy,  
The [German] submarines were helped by the British decision not to 
convoy ships with speeds of less than 9 knots or more than 13; during 
1940 sixty per cent of ships sunk were not sailing in convoy.  In that same 
year 992 ships were sunk, totaling 3.4 million tons, a quarter of British 
merchant shipping.46 
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When the Americans entered the war, they made the same mistake the British had 
made in 1940: 
The Americans sent merchant ships and oil tankers without escort, 
unconvoyed, using radio so openly that the submarines had no difficulty in 
closing on the isolated vessels as each betrayed their position…  The 
American navy had encouraged cargo ships to sail independently, without 
escorts…  In four months 1.2 million tons of shipping was sunk off the 
American coast alone.  The Allies lost 2.6 million tons of shipping 
between January and April, more than had been lost in the Atlantic in the 
whole of 1941.  U-boat losses in January were only three, in February only 
two.47 
The Americans had thought that the convoying of British and Canadian merchants 
in 1940-41 had caused the vessels to be more vulnerable to submarine attack.  After four 
months, with the lesson having been learned the hard way and at the urging of British 
naval intelligence, “Convoying was instituted, together with a blackout and radio 
silence.”48  Intelligence sharing had directly altered the Allied maritime shipping 
strategy. 
The second way intelligence sharing proved crucial to Allied success in the Battle 
of the Atlantic was through code breaking.  The European Theater in World War II was a 
two-fold battle of wits for both the Allies and for Germany, with each side making every 
effort to break the enemy’s codes and to keep their own codes secure.  Unlike their 
American counterparts, the British had not dismantled their intelligence organizations 
and infrastructure between world wars, giving them a decided advantage in breaking 
German codes when the war began.  The enterprising Americans caught on quickly, but 
British intelligence and ULTRA, the British codename for their ability to intercept and 
decrypt German messages, led the way for Allied intelligence. 
As previously mentioned, Allied re-supply efforts relied predominantly on the 
steady flow of men and materiel across the Atlantic Ocean.  The Germans understood this 
fact, and committed their stealthy U-boat submarines to the task of disrupting the Allied 
flow of supplies from the United States.  The Germans also developed a sophisticated 
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encryption machine, codenamed Enigma, which, at the outset of the war, consisted of a 
series of three mechanical rotors connected by a complex series of electronic switches 
and circuits.  Each letter typed on the Enigma machine would stand for a different letter, 
but with each successive letter typed, the rotors turned, changing the coding mechanism 
and exponentially complicating the encryption.  The receiver of an Enigma encoded 
message would have to set the rotors to the correct configuration in order to be able to 
decrypt the message.  The Enigma system was so complex as to be believed by the 
Germans to be mathematically incapable of compromise. 
British intelligence gradually attained a decent measure of success against the 
three-rotor Enigma in the opening years of the war before American entry.  According to 
John Keegan, on February 1, 1942, German U-boats began using four rotors in their 
Enigma machines, further hampering Allied decryption efforts.49.  The subsequent stretch 
of the war during which the Allied intelligence team was stymied by the shift in the 
German encryption mechanisms was by far the most costly for the Allied convoy supply 
effort.  From December 1941 to August 1942, the Allies lost 609 merchant ships and 
tankers, totaling over 3.1 million gross tons, while the Germans lost a mere 22 U-boats. 
With the Americans fully on board after Pearl Harbor, the Anglo-American 
intelligence team worked feverishly on the joint task of breaking the Enigma code.  The 
Allies finally cracked the Enigma code in April 1943, and the tide of the Battle of the 
Atlantic turned permanently in favor of the Allies, enabling them to ascertain the 
locations and intentions of German U-boats, re-direct merchant shipping convoys, and 
vector anti-submarine aircraft and warships to prosecute the enemy submarines.  
According to Keegan, “In May 1943, of the forty-nine U-boats which sailed on patrol to 
the North Atlantic convoy routes, eighteen were lost, a destruction rate of over one in 
three.  Between them, the forty-nine boats sank only two merchantmen.”50  The 
coordinated Anglo-American code-breaking effort directly enabled this monumental 
success. 
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According to General Eisenhower, the Anglo-American intelligence collaboration 
efforts were “decisive” in determining the outcome of the war in the European theater 
and were consequently vital to the success of U.S.-UK security cooperation.51  In a letter 
dated July 1945 to the Chief of the British Secret Service, Eisenhower gave effusive 
praise and unequivocal credit to Anglo-American intelligence: “The intelligence which 
has emanated from you before and during this campaign has been of priceless value to 
me.  It has simplified my task as a commander enormously.  It has saved thousands of 
British and American lives and, in no small way, contributed to the speed with which the 
enemy was routed and eventually forced to surrender.”52 
3. The Cold War 
The Cold War clearly demonstrated the value and importance of intelligence 
sharing to the Anglo-American “special relationship.”  When one side withheld 
intelligence, the relationship suffered; when both countries shared intelligence, the 
relationship flourished.  Additionally, the Cold War showed that the forming of an 
alliance is not sufficient to cause enhanced security cooperation; intelligence sharing, 
however, is sufficient. 
a.  The McMahon Act 
The Cold War began with a massive obstacle to Anglo-American 
intelligence exchange.  In 1946, the U.S. Congress passed the McMahon Act, which 
effectively cut off the British from the nuclear secrets which they had had a hand in 
developing during World War II.  According to Baylis: 
Despite close collaboration in the Manhattan project and a series of 
wartime agreements (at Quebec in August 1943 and Hyde Park, New York 
state, in September 1944) which promised continuing post-war 
cooperation in the atomic energy field, the United States passed the 
McMahon Act in August 1946 prohibiting the passing of classified atomic 
energy information to all foreign countries, including Britain, ‘on pain of 
life imprisonment or even death.’53 
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This overt truncation of the atomic partnership stemmed partly from fear 
of Soviet spies in the nuclear program and partly from the notion that the United States 
had begun to see itself as the power to stand in opposition to the Soviet Union, rather than 
merely the leader of the allied opposition to Soviet Communism it was to become.  David 
Dimbleby called this severance of atomic ties a “casualty of America’s new 
nationalism.”54 
Because the United States had effectively cut off the British from their 
nuclear intelligence, the relationship was badly damaged.  For the United Kingdom, the 
McMahon Act in tandem with the abrupt termination of Lend-Lease just eight days after 
the end of World War II signaled a disastrous decline in British power and influence.  
The British became determined to develop nuclear weapons and technology independent 
of the United States, exerting every possible asset and employing every available tactic to 
acquire what they deemed as necessary knowledge.  Concurrently, the British redoubled 
their efforts to reconcile the Anglo-American partnership to the point of coining the term 
“special relationship.”  In a speech given in Missouri in 1946 during his hiatus from the 
Prime Minister’s office, Winston Churchill articulated the British desire for “a special 
relationship between the United States and the British Commonwealth.”  Churchill 
proposed a “fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples,” which was, according 
to Dimbleby and Reynolds, “the only hope for a ‘haggard’ world, in which all 
countries… were now confronted by the peril of communism.”55  Churchill’s speech 
elucidated both the problem and the solution: the shared threat of communism forced a 
brotherhood to stand together in opposition, working together in every possible way to 
thwart the mutual enemy.  Churchill’s speech was not well-received by the Americans at 
the time, but it gave the “special relationship” a name and articulated its necessity, an 
idea to which both the United States and the United Kingdom would later reconcile. 
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b. Communist Spies 
In addition to the damage inflicted by the policy shift in the McMahon 
Act, high profile cases of espionage threatened to diminish the effectiveness of the 
Anglo-American intelligence relationship even further.  In the 1930s, Soviet intelligence 
successfully recruited several British college students.  Among them was a young man 
named H.A.R. “Kim” Philby, the son of a British diplomat.  Philby began working in 
British intelligence in 1944, and after World War II became the head of Britain’s Soviet 
counterintelligence desk.  From 1949-1951, Philby served as the British intelligence 
liaison to the CIA in Washington, DC.56 
Throughout his time in British intelligence, Philby fed highly sensitive and 
classified British and American intelligence to the Soviet Union.  His unique positions 
enabled him both to inform the Soviets of Anglo-American intelligence activities and to 
prevent Anglo-American intelligence collected against the Soviets from being acted 
upon.  Philby singlehandedly undermined several major intelligence operations, which 
resulted in the capture, arrest, torture, or murder of hundreds of British and American 
intelligence operatives.57 
In 1951, amidst the anxiety in Anglo-American intelligence relations 
caused by the McMahon Act, the revelation that Philby and other British officials he had 
recruited and assisted were Soviet spies cracked the foundation of trust in the Anglo-
American intelligence relationship.  Had the mutual threat of Soviet expansionism not 
continued to hold America and Britain together, the work of Kim Philby and his 
associates may well have severed the long-standing intelligence friendship.  The threat 
that the Soviet Union posed to both the United States and the United Kingdom required 
intelligence collaboration between them, ensuring the primacy of Anglo-American  
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security cooperation, and hence the continuation of the “special relationship.”  Yet even 
with such seemingly catastrophic revelations, the partnership had still not yet reached the 
fullest extent of its ebb. 
c.  The North Atlantic Treaty, the Suez Crisis and Sputnik 
On April 4, 1949, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and 
nine other European countries signed the North Atlantic Treaty, creating a security 
alliance which declared that “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or 
North America shall be considered an attack against them all…”58  As events the 
following decade would show, however, a security alliance was not sufficient to ensure 
enhanced security cooperation; intelligence sharing, or the lack thereof, held sway as the 
determining factor in Anglo-American security cooperation through the Cold War. 
The Suez Crisis in 1956 serves as a prime example of how much the 
“special relationship” suffered in the absence of effective intelligence sharing, in spite of 
the formation of a security alliance.  The British took specific policy positions based on 
their own special intelligence while alienating the United States from that intelligence 
and their intentions.  The result was an unexpected and awkward British confrontation 
with overt American disapproval. 
The Suez Crisis was precipitated by Egyptian President Nasser’s 
announcement that the Suez Canal was to be nationalized.  The United Kingdom, in 
concert with France and Israel, took military action in order to prevent the nationalization 
of the canal and to keep the key waterway open to Western commerce.  The Crisis was 
exacerbated by the fact that, while America was fully aware of Britain’s frustration with 
Nasser’s decision, the British deliberately did not inform Washington of their intentions 
to take military action against Egypt.  The United Kingdom counted on American 
support, in part due to the historical alliance and the “special relationship,” but also 
because of Nasser’s pro-communist rhetoric and diplomatic recognition of communist 
China.  The degradation of the “special relationship” was reflected in Washington’s 
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infamous rejection of Britain’s power play; instead, the United States took diplomatic, 
economic, and even military measures to prevent the success of the invasion.  The Crisis 
marked what Baylis called “the post-war nadir in Anglo-American relations.”59  This 
relational trough was directly precipitated by Britain’s unwillingness to share with the 
United States the intelligence underlying their policy positions.  The failure induced by 
lack of intelligence exchange was disastrous and denoted what Dimbleby and Reynolds 
referred to as “the worst rift of the twentieth century between Britain and America.”60   
Counterfactually, it is difficult to say with certainty what would have 
happened had the British disclosed their Suez intentions to the United States prior to 
taking military action.  Based on the outcome of the events, however, if the British had 
made their operational intentions known to the United States in advance, the Americans 
would likely have made clear their probable response: diplomatic abandonment, public 
international condemnation of the action, and an economic bombshell amounting to a run 
on the British pound.  With these reactions in mind, the British may have reconsidered 
taking military action to re-take the Suez, instead pursuing ensured access to the Canal 
through other means while maintaining solidarity with the United States.  The importance 
of the lack of intelligence sharing in aggravating the Suez Crisis cannot be overstated, 
and had intelligence been shared, the Crisis would likely have been averted. 
While the British were still reeling from the American actions during the 
Suez Crisis, the Soviet Union launched their first satellite “Sputnik” into space.  The 
success of Sputnik forced the United States to acknowledge the possibility that the Soviet 
Union was technologically far superior and could pose a direct threat to the U.S. 
homeland.  No longer could the Americans continue to operate under the delusion that 
they could confront the Soviet threat alone.  Taken in tandem with the Suez Crisis, 
Sputnik prompted the Eisenhower administration to recognize the need to re-establish the 
“special relationship.”  Eisenhower began by revisiting the McMahon Act and sharing 
nuclear technology, acknowledging the importance of intelligence cooperation to the 
success of the “special relationship.”  Additionally, the United States began forward 
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staging Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles in the United Kingdom, and assisted the 
British in configuring their bombers to carry American air-launched nuclear missiles.  
The result of these revitalization efforts was the 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defense 
Agreement, which repealed the McMahon Act and took positive action to share nuclear-
related secrets between the United States and the United Kingdom.  According to Baylis, 
the successes enjoyed by the “special relationship” from 1958 through the end of the 
Cold War can all be traced back to the passage of the Agreement, with its codicils 
reconciling the nuclear aspects of intelligence relationship broken by the McMahon 
Act.61  The Agreement officially recognized the indispensible role of intelligence sharing 
to the crucial security aspect of the “special relationship.” 
d. Intelligence Sharing Persisted Due to Common Threat 
Despite American hesitancy to share its own nuclear intelligence with its 
British partners, despite the broken trust of spy infiltration, and despite British 
withholding of operational intelligence and intentions during this period of friction, the 
close Anglo-American intelligence sharing relationship continued and flourished in other 
areas, specifically with regard to the Soviet nuclear threat.  Baylis describes “the 
continuation of intelligence collaboration to assess Soviet atomic developments” as a key 
element of continuity and stability through the early years of the Cold War.  This 
indicates that the shared view of the threat posed by the mutual Soviet enemy formed the 
impetus to share information on that threat, in the face of barriers to sharing intelligence 
in other venues. 
Ironically, the first official codification of the “special relationship” 
occurred within the context of the British-American standoff on nuclear technology.  
Both countries signed a then-Top Secret document on May 6, 1950 entitled “Agreed 
Anglo-American Report: Continued Consultation on and Coordination of Policy.”  The 
report laid out shared American and British objectives and responsibilities in thwarting 
the spread of communism throughout the world, resolving that in order to address the 
issue properly, “there should be continuous consultation and close co-ordination of policy 
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between them.”62  It was as if both British and American leaders were covertly 
demonstrating the resiliency of the intelligence aspect of partnership in spite of overt 
post-war political strife.  The overarching and mutual threat posed by the Soviet Union 
demanded such cooperation. 
In spite of the political angst generated in the wake of American 
nationalistic policies, the classified Report acknowledged both the pre-existence and the 
critical importance of the close working relationship: “It is of course recognised [sic] that 
the development of closer consultation with other like-minded Governments is desirable, 
and that opportunity should be taken to develop the practice, which already takes place in 
a wide field.”63  As this document spelled out, in many ways the “special relationship” 
which existed between the United States and the United Kingdom during the Cold War 
was, despite the political hiccups in the late 1940s and early 1950s, merely a continuation 
of the alliance established during World War I and fostered and solidified during World 
War II.  Particularly the military and intelligence apparatus which had been so formidable 
on the Western Front transferred and adapted to face the rising threat posed by 
expansionist Soviet Communism. 
The ability of the United States and the United Kingdom to share 
intelligence regarding the Soviet threat in spite of political anxiety and lack of sharing 
and agreement in other areas bears this out.  For instance, the initial flights of the 
American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft in the 1950s were based out of the United 
Kingdom, and “the U.S Air Force and the Royal Air Force shared the results of slant 
photography along the borders of the Soviet Union (and probably also the products of 
their occasional accidently or purposeful penetrations of Soviet air space).”64  Repeatedly 
throughout the Cold War, political disagreements arose which threatened the vitality of 
the “special relationship.”  Britain’s lack of support for American action in Vietnam in 
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the 1960s and Grenada in 1983 are just two other examples of such political speed bumps 
during which intelligence continued to flow freely in both directions with regard to the 
Soviet Union.65  The fact that the British and Americans continued to share intelligence 
on the Soviet threat throughout this time period demonstrates again that the need to share 
outweighed whatever hesitancy existed due to political conflict.  In many ways 
intelligence exchange provided continuity through the crises which enabled reconciliation 
when the dust settled. 
Again, counterfactually it would be difficult to assess with any degree of 
certainty what would have occurred in the Cold War had the United States and the United 
Kingdom not shared intelligence on the Soviet threat.  Ernest May and Gregory Treverton 
allude to the pooling of American and British intelligence resources out of necessity, 
asserting that both countries “faced lean times” in addition to a common enemy during 
the Cold War years.66  It appears that the intelligence agencies in the United States and 
Britain realized at the time the dire consequences of not sharing intelligence: that the 
Soviet Union would have the upper hand in terms of intelligence capability and 
resources; that the Soviets would be able to plan, operate, and maneuver with reduced 
chance of detection; and that the Western security position would be weak and 
vulnerable.  Conversely, by sharing intelligence, the United States and the United 
Kingdom complemented each other’s strengths, supplemented each other’s weaknesses, 
and continued to solidify the relationship forged in the fires of two World Wars.  This 
intelligence collaboration enhanced bilateral security cooperation, which countered the 
Soviet threat, enabled victory in the Cold War, and ensured the primacy of the “special 
relationship” into the next millennium. 
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E. INTELLIGENCE SHARING HAS KEPT THE “SPECIAL 
RELATIONSHIP” SPECIAL 
The “special relationship” from World War I, to World War II, and throughout 
the overarching Cold War was marked by consistent agreement between the United 
States and the United Kingdom on the nature of the enemy and the threat he posed both 
to each country individually and to the West collectively.  That is not to say that the 
Anglo-American relationship was without its political friction; rather, intelligence sharing 
both reflects and fosters a common threat view.  The development and maintenance of 
this common threat view through intelligence sharing has been and continues to be the 
critical element in the security aspect of the “special relationship,” in spite of political 
strain. 
Intelligence sharing did not win or lose World War I by itself, but the British 
disclosure of the Zimmermann telegram to President Wilson was integral in prompting 
American entry into the war and in providing the genesis for the “special relationship.”  
World War II was decided on the battlefields, on the high seas, and in the open skies, but 
Anglo-American intelligence collaboration proved, as General Eisenhower labeled it, 
“decisive” in enabling the Allied victory and critical in giving depth and substance to the 
burgeoning “special relationship.”  The Cold War was won by superior economic 
strength, superior policies, and superior leadership, but Anglo-American intelligence 
exchange permitted continuity in the partnership, maintained a shared focus on the Soviet 
nuclear threat, and ultimately provided the basis for the deterrent whereby the Soviet 
Union and the Communist Bloc imploded.  Intelligence sharing did not prevent Anglo-
American political disagreements regarding access to nuclear technology, nor did it 
prevent political anxiety during the Suez Crisis and other such debacles, and it suffered 
serious setbacks due to the revelations about Kim Philby and his spy ring. Intelligence 
exchange did provide a measure of stability through these political crises, which ensured 




The triad formed by common culture, economic interdependence, and security 
cooperation has created an Anglo-American partnership which is, to this point in history, 
a unique relationship between sovereign nations.  While no pillar stands alone, the 
security aspect of the relationship distinguishes the Anglo-American relationship as truly 
“special.”  Because of its vital role in the foundation of the Anglo-American security 
relationship, because of its history of success, because of the trust required in order to 
ensure the continuation of that success in the long term, and because of its ability to 
endure and to thrive in spite of political anxiety, intelligence exchange between the 
United States and the United Kingdom has demonstrated its critical value in setting apart 
the “special relationship” as special. 
While the 20th century saw the “special relationship” formed, solidified, and 
strengthened through the contributions of Anglo-American intelligence sharing, events at 
the dawn of the 21st century put the “special relationship” to the test and shine the 
spotlight on intelligence as both the problem and the solution for emergent crises.  In 
Chapter III, this thesis examines the impact of the September 11, 2001 tragedy on 
intelligence, discusses the influence of intelligence on the public justification for the 
American decision to pursue military action against Saddam Hussein’s regime and the 
British decision to support American action, and assesses the role Anglo-American 
intelligence sharing played in affirming those decisions. 
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III. ANGLO-AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE SHARING IN THE 
PRESENT-DAY “SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP” 
Intelligence sharing has been shown to comprise a critical element in the history 
of the Anglo-American “special relationship,” but how has intelligence exchange 
manifested itself in more recent events?  This chapter examines the current state of the 
U.S.-UK intelligence sharing relationship in the context of the ongoing Iraq war by 
answering the question: did intelligence influence the American decision to pursue war 
against the regime of Saddam Hussein and the British decision to support American 
action in Iraq, and if so, what impact did the exchange of intelligence between the United 
States and the United Kingdom have on those decisions?  This chapter argues that, 
despite ex post facto statements to the contrary, both President George W. Bush and 
Prime Minister Tony Blair based their decisions solidly on the analysis of their respective 
intelligence communities.  Furthermore, this chapter argues that intelligence shared 
between the United States and the United Kingdom not only had a direct bearing on the 
analytical conclusions which led the two countries toward military action in Iraq, but also 
provided the confirmation needed to justify military action to both domestic and 
international audiences.  This chapter concludes that, because of the conditions of 
intelligence exchange which led to the Iraq war, Anglo-American intelligence is now 
unified as never before and scrutinized as never before. 
To place the “special relationship” in the context of the present day, however, 
requires defining “present day” as the period of time which has followed September 11, 
2001.  9/11 was a seminal event in the history of the United States and in the history of 
the world.  Its effects are still being felt and will likely continue to be felt into the 
foreseeable future.  As it bears on this discussion, the greatest impact of the 9/11 attacks 
was that they drastically altered the way Britain and America defined a threat.  No longer 
was the definition of what constituted a “threat” restricted to entities with the capability 
and intent to do harm to the United States and its allies, but rather it was expanded 
substantially after 9/11 to include those entities with the intention to seek the capability to 
harm the America and its foreign partners.  In his 2003 State of the Union Address, 
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President Bush spelled out the reasoning of this altered threat perception, characterizing 
“rogue” states which possessed or pursued WMD as implicitly more dangerous than even 
the terrorist organizations themselves: 
Today, the gravest danger in the war on terror, the gravest danger facing 
America and the world, is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, 
chemical, and biological weapons.  These regimes could use such weapons 
for blackmail, terror, and mass murder.  They could also give or sell those 
weapons to terrorist allies, who would use them without the least 
hesitation.67 
If any country met the criteria of this altered threat definition, it was Saddam 
Hussein’s Iraq.  Saddam’s support for terror had been well-publicized.  Between 
September 2000 and March 2003, Saddam’s regime had donated approximately $35 
million (U.S.) to the families of Palestinian militants killed in conflict with Israelis, with 
a $25,000 going to the family of each suicide bomber.68  Furthermore, while foreign and 
domestic analysts varied on how best to deal with Iraqi WMD, few openly doubted the 
assessments of the American intelligence community stating that Saddam possessed and 
was pursuing WMD.  Within the U.S. Intelligence Community, only the State 
Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) offered anything resembling a 
dissenting opinion to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate’s conclusions, and 
even that dissention was couched in ambivalence, “neither endorsing nor opposing” the 
conclusion that Saddam Hussein was harboring WMD.69  Additionally, virtually every 
major foreign intelligence agency concurred with the assessment that Saddam possessed 
WMD, including those of the United Kingdom, Germany, Russia, China, Israel, and 
France.70  As Lowenthal states, “The fall 2002 debate at the UN was over the best way to  
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determine if [Saddam Hussein] possessed these weapons and how best to get rid of them, 
not over whether or not Iraq had them.”71  By all counts, Iraq fit President Bush’s new 
threat threshold. 
Two vital questions emerge from this post-9/11 change in threat perception: did 
intelligence influence the ultimate decision of the United States and the United Kingdom 
to pursue military action against Saddam Hussein’s regime in March 2003, and if so, 
what impact did the sharing of intelligence between America and Britain have on those 
decisions? 
A.  DID INTELLIGENCE INFLUENCE THE DECISION TO GO TO WAR IN 
IRAQ? 
The answer to the above question might seem to be an obvious and resounding 
yes.  In his 2003 State of the Union Address, President Bush listed several data points in 
support of his allegation that Iraq possessed WMD, citing American intelligence as the 
source: 
Our intelligence officials estimate that Saddam Hussein had the materials 
to produce as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agent.  In 
such quantities, these chemical agents could also kill untold thousands… 
U.S. intelligence indicates that Saddam Hussein had upwards of 30,000 
munitions capable of delivering chemical agents.  Inspectors recently 
turned up 16 of them – despite Iraq’s recent declaration denying their 
existence.72 
The next month, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the United 
Nations in an effort to garner international support for militarily enforcing the UN 
Security Council Resolution demanding that Saddam Hussein disarm Iraq’s WMD.  
Powell had been instrumental in convincing President Bush of the need to “go the extra 
mile with the UN”73 and made it clear that he would not have been comfortable pursuing 
military action without the intelligence to justify it.  Powell played for the council 
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numerous audio recordings, electronically intercepted phone calls, and voice 
transmissions on which America had based its conclusion that Saddam possessed and was 
attempting to conceal WMD.  He also cited a number of human sources which confirmed 
the suspicion that Iraq’s WMD program was being hidden from UN inspectors.  He 
displayed several satellite photos showing the purported movement of WMD-related 
vehicles and personnel, noting that the timing of such movement relative to the arrival of 
UN weapons inspectors led to the conclusion that evidence of WMD was being 
concealed.  Powell declared plainly that all of the statements he was making to the 
council were “backed up by sources, solid sources.  These are not assertions.  What we’re 
giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence.”74 
However, after it became clear that Saddam Hussein’s WMD program was 
nowhere near as prolific as either British or American intelligence had assessed it to be 
prior to the war, President Bush and Prime Minister Blair each stated independently that 
he would have pursued military action against Saddam Hussein even knowing the truth 
about Iraq’s lack of WMD.  According to Richard Betts, “If we are to believe President 
Bush, mistaken intelligence did not cause his decision for war, because he had other 
reasons for wanting to destroy the Saddam Hussein regime.  Bush later claimed that he 
would have launched the war even if he had known that Iraq did not have WMD.”75  
Robert Jervis makes a similar claim: 
President George W. Bush has been forthright in his affirmation that he 
would have proceeded anyway [knowing that Iraq lacked WMD], arguing 
that Saddam wanted WMD, especially nuclear weapons, and that 
sanctions and inspections could at best have slowed him down.  
Furthermore, Saddam was a tyrant and so there was a great danger that he 
would make enormous trouble once he had them.  Previously acceptable 
risks were too great to run in the post-9/11 world.76 
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Prime Minister Blair made remarkably parallel claims that he would have 
proceeded in the same manner, regardless of the intelligence assessments.  A BBC News 
report states, “With ‘hindsight,’ Mr. Blair told [Members of Parliament], the case against 
Saddam Hussein would probably have been made in a different way, with separate 
reports from the [Joint Intelligence Committee] and the government, but the end result 
would have been the same.”  The report quotes Blair making unrepentant assertions 
strikingly similar to those of President Bush: “I cannot honestly say I believe getting rid 
of Saddam was a mistake at all.  Iraq, the region, the wider world is a better and safer 
place without Saddam.”77 
Despite these statements after the fact, both Bush and Blair clearly based their 
decisions to pursue military action in Iraq on intelligence.  Two separate pieces of 
evidence affirm this.  First, great pains were taken to utilize intelligence to make the case 
for military action in both domestic and international forums.  Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Paul Wolfowitz stated that the reason the Iraqi WMD intelligence was put at the 
forefront of the public case for war was that it was “the one issue that everyone could 
agree on.”78  As Betts states, “The presumed existence of [WMD], however, was the only 
reason that the [Bush] administration could secure public support to make the war 
politically feasible.  Had Bush presented the case for war in 2002 as he did a few years 
later, denying that neutralizing WMD was a necessary condition, no one but fanatics 
would have lined up behind him.”79  As Herman summarized, “Intelligence has been the 
public justification of a pre-emptive war.”80 
Second, if the Bush and Blair administrations had not based their decisions on 
intelligence, then there would have been no need to conduct extensive, formal 
investigations of the intelligence failures prior to the war.  According to Jervis, 
“intelligence informs policy.  The fact that only those countries that supported the war 
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held investigations is consistent with this view…, and most of the investigations imply a 
link between intelligence and policy.  They almost have to: if there were none, why 
bother with the investigation?”81 
Thus, intelligence absolutely influenced the Bush administration’s decision to 
pursue military action against Saddam Hussein and Blair’s decision to support military 
action.  But the question remains: to what extent did the exchange of intelligence between 
the United States and the United Kingdom impact these decisions? 
B. THE EFFECT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE 
ON THE PURSUIT OF WAR 
While primary evidence of specific intelligence shared between the United States 
and the United Kingdom in the lead-up to war in Iraq remains classified and 
compartmented, accurate conclusions about the impact of such exchanges can be drawn 
from unclassified secondary sources.  This section examines standing Anglo-American 
intelligence agreements, the extensive use of UN weapons inspectors’ reports by both 
British and American analysts, and statements by British and American public officials 
acknowledging the influence of shared data on their respective intelligence analyses and 
subsequent policy decisions. 
1. Independent Assessments Made on the Basis of Common Intelligence 
Two main problems arise in attempting to determine the influence of intelligence 
sharing on American and British pre-war decisions.  First, standing intelligence 
agreements and routine business practices render some segments of intelligence common 
to both countries.  Second, a substantial portion of the intelligence upon which the pre-
war decisions were made was derived from reports of UN weapons inspectors, which 
were also common to both countries.82 
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a.  Anglo-American Intelligence Agreements 
So much intelligence is routinely exchanged between Britain and America 
that it becomes difficult to distinguish between what has been shared and what has been 
withheld.  This is especially true with regard to standing agreements pertaining to signals 
intelligence (SIGINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT). 
The United States and the United Kingdom began the regular practice of 
sharing SIGINT products during World War II and formally adopted the exchange of 
SIGINT as a standard business practice under the UKUSA Agreement in 1947.83  In 
conjunction with other Anglosphere nations (Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), the 
United States and United Kingdom officially divided the responsibility for collecting and 
disseminating SIGINT within the Anglosphere.  This division of responsibility is 
indicative not only of an ongoing exchange of intelligence, but also of the fact that the 
intelligence was and continues to be common to all five partners in the Anglosphere.  Per 
this agreement, the transfer of SIGINT between the United States and the United 
Kingdom is so seamless as to be nearly transparent.  This agreement remains in effect to 
the present day, meaning that British and American intelligence analysts undoubtedly had 
access to one another’s SIGINT in assessing Iraqi WMD. 
Similarly, the United States regularly shares IMINT within the 
Anglosphere.  The U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), America’s 
administrative lead organization for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of 
imagery, readily admits having an intimate imagery sharing relationship with the United 
Kingdom.  According to NGA’s unclassified website, “we openly acknowledge that we 
routinely share imagery of common concern with the governments of Australia, Canada, 
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and Great Britain.”84  Again, because this practice remains valid, the American and 
British intelligence services were probably working from the same imagery in analyzing 
the Iraqi WMD problem set in the lead-up to war. 
It is safe to deduce that, based on standing agreements and routine sharing 
practices, the UK intelligence apparatus at a minimum had access to, and in some cases 
was likely the source of, much of the intelligence that Colin Powell presented to the 
United Nations on February 5, 2003.  At the very least, the SIGINT and IMINT data 
presented by Powell were, in all likelihood, common to both British and American 
intelligence analysts. 
b.  Reports of UN Weapons Inspectors 
Unlike SIGINT and IMINT, indigenous human intelligence (HUMINT) 
sources were lacking in building the case for war in Iraq.  One reason for this, according 
to Robert Jervis, “was that the US and UK relied heavily on UN inspections in the years 
when they were in place and never developed substitutes when they were withdrawn.”85  
The evidence of this is clear in both British and American investigations after no WMD 
was found in Iraq.  In his assessment of the investigation reports, Lawrence Lamanna 
concluded, “both the UK and U.S. had relied heavily on information from the UN 
inspection teams for a period of time, and were thus getting the same information.”86 
Essentially, British and American intelligence analysts had common 
access to and made extensive use of the same intelligence data.  In examining the 
investigation reports, there is no evidence of Anglo-American collusion on the analysis of 
this shared data, only strong evidence that each country’s intelligence services based 
their conclusions on largely common intelligence data, including routinely-shared 
SIGINT and IMINT sources, as well as the UN inspection teams’ reports. 
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2. Public Statements Affirming Anglo-American Intelligence Linkage 
Beyond the evidence that shows British and American intelligence analysts were 
operating from essentially the same intelligence base, several statements by public 
officials confirm that sources were shared and utilized in forming conclusions about Iraqi 
WMD.  President Bush referenced British intelligence in his 2003 State of the Union: 
“The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant 
quantities of uranium from Africa.”87  Colin Powell also made reference to British 
intelligence in his presentation to the United Nations: “I would call my colleagues 
attention to the fine paper that the United Kingdom distributed yesterday, which 
describes in exquisite detail Iraqi deception activities.”88  That both referenced British 
reports proved false in the final analysis does not diminish the facts that American 
analysts had access to the reports, that they had presented the reports to policymakers in 
support of their argument against Saddam Hussein, and that those policymakers had, in 
turn, utilized the reports to make the case for war in Iraq to both domestic and 
international audiences. 
British officials also offered public statements affirming that intelligence shared 
between the United States and United Kingdom mutually impacted policy.  According to 
Herman, “The British representative on the [UN] Security Council was reported to say in 
March (2003) that the failure to reach agreement was because France, Germany and 
Russia were not working off the same intelligence base as the UK and US.”89  Implicit in 
this statement is the idea that the United States and the United Kingdom were indeed 
operating off a common intelligence base, and that it was the common intelligence base 
which convinced the British and American administrations that war was a necessary 
means to achieve the end of an Iraq free of WMD. 
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C. THE CONFIRMING EFFECT OF INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENTS 
While intelligence analysts in both the United States and the United Kingdom 
were operating from the same intelligence base to draw their conclusions about Iraqi 
WMD, there is no evidence to suggest that American analyst were cooperating with their 
British counterparts, and vice-versa, in conducting analysis of the common intelligence 
data.  Both the Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence 
Assessments in Iraq from the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and its 
British counterpart, the Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, noted 
extensive use of the same intelligence data, but neither report made any reference to 
Anglo-American collaboration in analyzing that data.  While absence of evidence is not 
necessarily evidence of absence, each investigation would likely have been eager to 
distribute culpability had it been warranted, yet neither did.  In other words, each 
country’s intelligence apparatus came to the same conclusion about Iraqi WMD 
independently, even though based off the same intelligence data. 
The fact that American and British intelligence services had arrived at the same 
conclusions independently served to validate those conclusions.  While Blair was unable 
to avoid popular characterizations of himself in the international media as President 
Bush’s lap dog, he was able to claim honestly that his intelligence apparatus had reached 
its own independent conclusions about Saddam Hussein’s WMD, which enabled him to 
justify to the British public his support for American military action in Iraq.  Similarly, 
with British confirmation, the United States was able to shrug off objections to war from 
other states in Europe and the Middle East, claiming that neither military action nor the 
intelligence which supported it was unilateral. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The “special relationship” manifested itself once again in the early years of the 
21st century in the unwavering support Great Britain offered the United States in pursuing 
the GWOT and military action to induce regime change in Iraq.  The American decision 
to go to war against the regime of Saddam Hussein and the British decision to support 
American action in Iraq came as a direct result of shared intelligence and analysis.  Pre-
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war intelligence sharing between the United States and the United Kingdom caused both 
countries to arrive at the same, independent conclusions about Iraqi WMD and had a 
confirming effect which served to validate the decision of each to seek or support regime 
change in Iraq.  The result has been distinct global loss of confidence in the Anglo-
American intelligence establishment, which has contributed to the political quandary in 
which Britain finds itself today (this quandary is the subject of Chapter IV). 
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IV. THE BRIDGE TO THE FUTURE OF ANGLO-AMERICAN 
INTELLIGENCE SHARING 
The future of intelligence sharing and the Anglo-American “special relationship” 
is inextricably linked to a critical decision facing the administrators of Great Britain’s 
foreign policy.  In recent decades, the United Kingdom has used its “special relationship” 
with the United States and its increasing importance in Europe to act as a transatlantic 
“bridge.”  Yet many policy analysts now claim that the United Kingdom must choose a 
primary foreign allegiance, either America or Europe.  This chapter discusses the reasons 
the British are facing this foreign policy dilemma, examines the ramifications of the 
decision on Anglo-American intelligence sharing, and applies the decision to potential 
threats the U.S.-UK alliance may face in the future.  This chapter argues that for both the 
United States and the United Kingdom, the intelligence sharing relationship would be 
better preserved by a continuation of the standing British policy than by an overt bias 
towards either the United States or Europe. 
A. THE BACKGROUND OF BRITAIN’S FOREIGN POLICY DILEMMA 
World War II marked the end of the preeminence of British global power.  The 
War left the United Kingdom in unfamiliar circumstances: short on money and 
manpower, steeped in debt, and dependent on a stronger foreign ally.  As the world 
polarized into its Cold War camps and Europe emerged as the main Cold War 
battleground, Great Britain leveraged its unique position between the United States and 
Europe.  Successive British Prime Ministers starting with Harold Macmillan in the 1950s 
leveraged the strength of the U.S.-UK relationship to increase British influence in 
Europe, while using Britain’s powerful position in Europe to gain clout in Washington.  
As such, the United Kingdom became the conduit through which Europe understood 
American Cold War policy and through which America exercised that policy in Europe.  
Particularly since UK accession to the European Union in 1973, British governments 
have, according to Kristin Archick, “sought to balance British interests between 
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Washington and Brussels.”90  By doing so, the British have performed a delicate 
balancing act which William Wallace calls “essential to the maintenance of British 
influence and prestige.”91 
As the Cold War ended, the British sought to sustain their influence over the 
world’s remaining superpower.  With the reunification of Germany and the expansion of 
the European Union, Europe remained a central focus of U.S. foreign policy, if not to the 
extent that it was during the Cold War.  With this altered but continued American focus 
on Europe, the United Kingdom redoubled its efforts to secure its position as the Euro-
American bridge.  After winning election as the British Prime Minister in 1997, Tony 
Blair succinctly summarized British foreign policy, stating that it should be 
strong in Europe and strong with the U.S.  There is no choice between the 
two.  Stronger with one means stronger with the other.  Our aim should be 
to deepen our relationship with the U.S. at all levels.  We are the bridge 
between the U.S. and Europe.  Let us use it.92 
The events of September 11, 2001 prompted the world to stand together in 
solidarity with the United States.  The leading daily newspapers in France and Italy 
proclaimed the same words: “We Are All Americans.”93  Yet, when the Bush 
administration sought international support to expand the Global War on Terror to Iraq, 
the international community was divided, with many previously supportive nations 
standing squarely in opposition to the United States.  Britain’s support, though, was so 
unwaveringly solid that many in Europe, including some prominent leaders, labeled 
Prime Minister Blair “Bush’s Poodle.”94  This pervasive view of the solidarity of Anglo-
American relations has actually become, to a large extent, detrimental to the effectiveness 
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of the “special relationship” within the international community, especially with the lack 
of discovery of the alleged WMD in Iraq.  Because the British and American intelligence 
communities had come to the same erroneous conclusion about Iraqi WMD and because 
the British and American policies favored pursuing and perpetuating the war in Iraq even 
when it became clear that no WMD would be found, many in the international 
community began to view the United States and the United Kingdom as a single, 
inseparable unit. 
The Iraq War has prompted many in Europe to call for the United Kingdom to 
make a choice between the United States and Europe.  The Europeans recognize the 
importance of Great Britain and its significance to the future of the European Union.  The 
United Kingdom maintains a powerful voice in the international community as a 
permanent voting member of the UN Security Council.  The British military is one of 
only two national military forces within the European Union capable of independent 
global operations (the other is France).  The United Kingdom also has the third largest 
GDP in the European Union, behind only France and Germany, totaling 14.2% of the 
EU-27’s total GDP.95  Over 50% of British trade is with other EU members96, making 
Britain an indispensible source of EU wealth.  From the European perspective, it is easy 
to recognize the integral role of the United Kingdom as a key player in a rising European 
Union. Many within the European Union balk at the seeming inseparability of the United 
States and United Kingdom, or even the continuation of Britain having a “special 
relationship” outside the European Union. 
Even within the United Kingdom, a groundswell of support toward greater 
integration with mainland Europe has been building.  According to Archick, “some UK 
foreign policy impulses are closer to those of its EU partners than to those of the United 
States.  For example, like several of its other EU partners, Britain places great emphasis 
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on multilateral institutions as a means for managing international crises and legitimizing 
the use of force.”97  Transatlantic Trends 2008 confirms the European leanings of the 
British in many areas, particularly in dealing with the United States.  In rating their 
feelings about the United States, for instance, Britons were only slightly ahead of the 
European average.98  In spite of these European leanings, however, the Transatlantic 
Trends 2008 survey found that United Kingdom maintains security views which are 
much more in tune with those of the United States than other European nations.  For 
example, when asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement “Under some 
conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice,” 75% of the Americans surveyed either 
agreed somewhat or agreed strongly, as did 62% of Britons; the highest percentage from 
another European country was 38% from the Netherlands, with Europeans on average 
agreeing 28% of the time.99  Additionally, British sentiment is significantly more in line 
with American thinking than the prevailing European attitude toward NATO.  When 
asked to what extent all NATO member countries should contribute troops if NATO 
decided to take military action, 82% of British respondents and the same percentage of 
Americans either strongly agreed or somewhat agreed; the European average was 57%.  
Thus, while in some policy areas, the United Kingdom may lean toward Europe, when it 
comes to security matters, the British still align more strongly with Americans than 
Europeans.   
Calls for an Atlanticist or Europeanist decision from the United Kingdom have 
not been limited to frustrated European partners; many in Washington wish to see Britain 
make its allegiance known as well.  According to Wallace and Oliver: 
In the months after the invasion of Iraq, the British government attempted 
to rebuild relations with the French and German governments, above all 
on closer cooperation in defense.  The depth of suspicion in Washington 
of French motives, however, and especially resistance within the US 
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Department of Defense to any modification of NATO’s dominant role in 
European security, suggested that there were many in Washington who 
wanted Britain to choose between its transatlantic and European links 
rather than to balance between them.100 
The American attitude toward the British function as the transatlantic bridge has 
been, to borrow an assessment from Jolyon Howorth, a bit “schizophrenic.”101  On the 
one hand, American administrations throughout the Cold War urged the United Kingdom 
toward accelerated integration into the European Community and indeed supported the 
idea of a generally integrated Europe.  According to Geir Lundestad, this support for 
European integration prevailed for five main reasons: first, European integration was 
viewed as being woven in the same cloth as American-style federalism; second, the belief 
that an integrated Europe would be more rational and more efficient; third, that a unified 
Europe would reduce the security burden on the United States; fourth, that consolidating 
Europe would promote the mutual goal of containing Soviet expansionism; and fifth, that 
an integrated Europe which embraced a unified Germany would serve as a check on 
resurgent German power, which had proven extremely volatile twice already in the 20th 
century.102 
On the other hand, U.S. presidents beginning with Richard Nixon, while 
maintaining support for European integration in general, started to promote confederate 
rather than federal arrangements, because they began to see that “in promoting an 
integrated Europe, Washington might actually push its best friends in Europe away.”103  
The Anglo-American “special relationship” was one prominent reason for this shift, as 
Nixon and Henry Kissinger feared that a supranational Europe would necessarily mean a 
weaker Anglo-American partnership.  The British “were following the American lead 
rather closely, but if their policies were to be submerged in a European community, the 
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result could easily be greater distance from the United States.”104  The same fear 
expressed by Nixon and Kissinger, that British integration into the European Union 
would weaken the Anglo-American “special relationship,” remain valid into the 21st 
century. 
Many policy analysts, particularly within the United Kingdom, have argued that a 
black-and-white United States or Europe decision is artificial; however, the concerns 
about such a decision on both sides of the Atlantic are very real.  The ramifications of 
Britain’s choice would fundamentally alter the “special relationship.”  The effects would 
be felt in virtually all policy areas, everything from economics to security policy, from 
human rights to climate change.  However, in no area would the impact of such a 
decision be more deeply felt than in Anglo-American intelligence sharing. 
B.  THE IMPACT OF A UK DECISION ON INTELLIGENCE SHARING 
Much can be deduced about the impacts of a UK decision on intelligence sharing.  
While a British decision may not pose a clear and present danger, it certainly poses an 
ambiguous and potential danger which could jeopardize the intelligence collaboration 
relationship that is the cornerstone of the Anglo-American alliance.  Intelligence sharing 
relationships are steeped in trust.  As a direct result, valuable intelligence sharing 
agreements tend to be bilateral, instead of multilateral.  Intelligence shared with just one 
other country is expected to remain in the confidence of that country. However, secrets 
shared in a multilateral intelligence organization become the common knowledge of all 
the member organizations.  For this very reason, Britain’s decision has tremendous 
bearing on the bilateral U.S.-UK intelligence sharing relationship. 
If the United Kingdom chooses to ally itself primarily with Europe, the excellent 
partnership Britain has with the United States would most assuredly be severely 
damaged.  A closer UK-EU relationship would likely diminish the ability of the U.S. 
intelligence community to continue trusting the United Kingdom with its most intimate 
secrets.  The terror attack on the Madrid rail system on March 11, 2004 “prompted calls 
for the creation of a European Union Intelligence Service comparable to the Central 
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Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States.”105  John M. Nomikos claims that one of 
the biggest obstacles to intelligence integration of this nature within the European Union 
is “the fear of spoiling privileged relationships,” particularly with the United States.106  
Multilateral intelligence exchange agreements among EU member states would virtually 
eliminate the ability of American intelligence analysts to trust British analysts with 
information regarding other EU member states, as, according to Nomikos, “[intelligence] 
organizations… tend to view international relations as a zero-sum game.”  This means 
that as intelligence cooperation between the United Kingdom and Europe increases, trust 
between the United States and Britain decreases.  Ongoing efforts in support of a 
European Security and Defense Policy will indubitably require a policy to coordinate 
intelligence sharing efforts among EU member states as well as an overarching 
organization to facilitate that intelligence exchange, since, as previous chapters have 
demonstrated, intelligence sharing is the critical component to successful security 
cooperation.  A closer UK-EU relationship would likely cause American analysts to 
hesitate to share intelligence with a British partner who might divulge those secrets to an 
EU partner with whom the United States would not ordinarily share intelligence. 
Conversely, if the United Kingdom declared the primacy of the Anglo-American 
relationship above its European partnership, the effectiveness of the U.S.-UK intelligence 
cooperation would still be diminished.  As was mentioned previously regarding the case 
of Iraqi WMD, a tight-knit Anglo-American intelligence community might begin to be 
seen as a single entity, rather than two independent organizations, to the detriment of 
both.   The Anglo-American intelligence sharing relationship is so successful today in 
large part because American and British intelligence agencies are able to use each other 
as relatively unbiased, independent confirmation on a variety of intelligence subjects of 
interest to both countries.  While the issue of Iraqi WMD exposed the weakness of the 
U.S.-UK intelligence cooperation effort in that both countries’ agencies turned out to be 
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wrong, it also revealed the potential strength of two well-respected, independent 
intelligence organizations each validating the conclusions of the other.  If the United 
Kingdom were to draw closer to the United States and away from its European 
partnership, the two agencies would begin to be viewed as one by outside observers, 
diminishing the weight of that independent confirmation and reducing the overall 
effectiveness of the intelligence partnership.  
Despite calls among Europeans for an “us or them”-type decision from the United 
Kingdom, a third option remains viable: maintaining the status quo.  Furthermore, as it 
pertains to intelligence exchange, it is in the best interests of both the United Kingdom 
and the United States for the British to continue on its present, centrist course.  For the 
British, maintaining the current balance permits ongoing privileged access to American 
intelligence sources and methods, while leaving the door open to agreements with other 
European nations.  It even gives the United Kingdom a powerful bargaining position in 
the formulation of multilateral, intra-European intelligence sharing policies.  For the 
United States, having Britain with its top-notch intelligence community as a close ally but 
with the ability to conduct analysis in parallel for comparison and validation is vital.  As 
much as former Prime Minister Blair might have wanted to claim that a decision did not 
exist, the British today face just such a decision.  A middle-of-the-road approach, 
however, provides a third alternative which would benefit both the United States and the 
United Kingdom, particularly as it regards intelligence cooperation. 
The middle-of-the-road policy enables a measured distance to develop between 
the United States and the United Kingdom which permits independent thinking and 
policymaking to occur while simultaneously nurturing the intelligence sharing 
partnership.  Economic policies, treaties, culture, social policies, views on climate 
change, international trade, even weapons development and the use of military force can 
all be independent without changing the ongoing effort to strengthen the trust necessary 
for even greater intelligence sharing between the two countries.  Maintaining this 
measured distance ensures that when America and Britain do stand together, it is not 
merely the result of an indistinguishable closeness, rather it is the result of two 
autonomous powers arriving at the same conclusion separately and pursuing a mutual 
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solution together.  This separation in world perception is necessary to enhance the 
effectiveness of the “special relationship,” which has been so badly damaged by the 
perception of the too close proximity evidenced in the Iraq war. 
C.  APPLYING THE BRITISH DECISION TO FUTURE THREATS 
The key aspect of the Anglo-American intelligence sharing relationship is the 
ability to use the intelligence exchange to collaborate on threats of mutual concern to 
both countries, to bring consensus on the nature of those threats, and to facilitate 
agreement on the best courses of action to deal with those threats.  The U.S.-UK alliance 
faces four current or emergent threats in the near future, and the established British 
“bridge” policy makes the Anglo-American intelligence team ideally suited to handle 
each of them. 
The first is the ongoing threat posed by Islamic extremism.  Combating the trans-
national nature of Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organizations, such as Al Qaida, 
requires international cooperation.  Since September 11, 2001, the Anglo-American 
intelligence apparatus has proven quite effective in collaborating on this mutual threat.  
One well-publicized example of this effectiveness was the thwarted transatlantic airline 
plot in August 2006.  Terrorists planned to detonate aircraft originating from London’s 
Heathrow Airport and heading toward the United States and Canada.  In a statement 
shortly after the plot was revealed and suspects were arrested, Prime Minister Blair 
credited Anglo-American collaboration for averting the disaster: “There has been an 
enormous amount of co-operation with the U.S. authorities which has been of great value 
and underlines the threat we face and our determination to counter it.”107  A strong 
Anglo-American intelligence sharing relationship is critical to thwarting attacks of this 
nature in the future. 
The second threat is that posed by a resurgent Russia.  As seen recently in 
Georgia, Russia maintains a concerted desire to re-exert its influence on the former 
Soviet Republics.  Having dealt with the Russian/Soviet threat for decades, the 
                                                 
107 BBC News.  “‘Airlines terror plot’ disrupted.”  August 10, 2006.  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4778575.stm (accessed September 25, 2008). 
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capabilities and the mentality of the Russians are, to a certain degree, known quantities.  
The United Kingdom is in a unique position, however, being more geo-politically aligned 
with many of the former Soviet Republics, to provide indications and warning of Russian 
activities.  This is especially true in the Baltic states, where Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania 
now operate as full members of the European Union alongside Britain.  Anglo-American 
intelligence is key in anticipating and preventing Russian resurgence. 
The third threat facing the Anglo-American alliance is China.  Unlike Russia, 
China is a relatively unknown quantity.  China boasts the world’s largest population, a 
surging economy, and a massive and capable armed force equipped with a nuclear 
arsenal.  In the international spotlight leading to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, China was 
on its best behavior.  Now that the Beijing Olympics are past, the question remains 
whether China will continue to make peaceful strides or flex its potent military muscle in 
the region.  With former colonies in the region, including Hong Kong, the United 
Kingdom has both greater experience in dealing with the Chinese than the United States 
and presumably assets in place to assess Chinese intentions. 
The fourth mutual threat facing the United States and United Kingdom comes 
from renegade nations, such as North Korea and Iran.  Renegade nations pose a 
tremendous risk to both Britain and America in that they are relatively unpredictable.  
Where Russia is a known quantity and China is a rational actor, renegade countries are 
less predictable.  The strength of the Anglo-American alliance will be critical in 
preventing surprises from these renegade nations, particularly from those countries which 
possess or are actively seeking to obtain or develop WMD. 
D.  EFFECTIVENESS CONTINGENT ON CLOSE BUT MEASURED 
DISTANCE 
Ironically, the “special relationship” is contingent on maintaining a measured 
distance between the United States and the United Kingdom.  If the partnership were too 
close, the two countries run the risk of becoming indistinguishable in the international 
community, which marginalizes the relationship’s powerful worldwide influence; if the 
United States and the United Kingdom are too far apart, or if the United Kingdom 
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becomes closer to the European Union than to America, the relationship risks losing its 
“special” quality.  Only at a close, but measured distance is the relationship both special 
and powerful.  John Dumbrell summarized the need, from the British perspective, for 
measured distance succinctly: “If the 1956 Suez crisis demonstrated the folly attaching to 
excessive defiance of the United States, 2003 may come to be seen as exemplifying the 
hazards of excessive public obedience.”108 
Ultimately, Britain should make every effort to continue to function as the bridge 
between the United States and Europe.  As Archick concludes, “Preserving the UK’s 
position as a strong U.S. ally and leading EU partner provides UK foreign policy with 
maximum flexibility to promote its diverse interests in Europe and beyond. 
Consequently, the UK will continue to seek close ties with both the United States and the 
EU for the foreseeable future.”109 
                                                 
108 John Dumbrell.  “The US-UK ‘Special Relationship’ in a World Twice Reformed.”  Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs.  Volume 17.  Number 3.  October 2004.  449. 
109 Archick, ii. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Intelligence sharing is vital in shaping the Anglo-American “special relationship.”  
Intelligence exchange is the defining characteristic of security cooperation, which is itself 
the most important feature of the “special relationship.”  The special nature of the Anglo-
American partnership began with intelligence sharing, which ushered in American entry 
into World War I.  The U.S.-UK intelligence relationship directly enabled victory in 
World War II, and provided stability and continuity throughout the Cold War. 
If the history of the Anglo-American “special relationship” is riddled with 
examples of the critical nature of intelligence sharing, so too is the modern world witness 
to the power of shared American and British intelligence.  While September 11, 2001 
changed the way Americans and Britons view threats and the onus of intelligence to 
detect and deter those threats, the tragic events of that date once again sealed the “special 
relationship” in blood.  Americans drew strength from the “special relationship” in that 
season of trial, and built on the foundation of shared intelligence to pursue those 
responsible for the massacre and those perceived to be seeking to duplicate or surpass it.  
Shared intelligence led directly to the American decision to pursue military action in Iraq 
and the British decision to support that action. 
The reputation of Anglo-American intelligence has suffered in the mutual failure 
in assessing Iraqi WMD.  Pressure from other European nations has put Great Britain in a 
political quandary, seemingly forcing the British to choose between Europe and the 
United States in declaring its primary allegiance.  The ramifications of a British decision 
of this nature on intelligence sharing would be extreme.  The most beneficial course of 
action, both for the United Kingdom and for the United States, would be to continue the 
“special relationship” at a close but measured distance.  This approach would best enable 
the British to join America in an international effort to thwart rising threats, while 
avoiding the perception of Britain and America as a single, inseparable entity. 
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As the “special relationship” is critical to the perpetuation of liberal ideals 
espoused by the United States and the United Kingdom, so too is intelligence sharing 
vital to the perpetuation of the “special relationship.” 
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